UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, v. CHRISTOPHER
LEE ARMSTRONG, et al.
No. 95-157
1995 U.S. Briefs 157
October Term, 1995
January 9, 1996
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS SHELTON AUNTWAN MARTIN, AARON
HAMPTON, CHRISTOPHER LEE ARMSTRONG, AND FREDDIE MACK
MARIA E. STRATTON, Federal Public Defender, BARBARA E. O'CONNOR *, Deputy
Public Defender, Suite 1503, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street,
Los Angeles, CA 90012, (213) 894-7331, Attorneys for Respondent Shelton Auntwan
Martin
* Counsel of Record
TIMOTHY C. LANNEN, 880 W. First St., Suite 516, Los Angeles, CA 90012, (213)
680-3617, Attorney for Respondent Aaron Hampton
DAVID DUDLEY, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800, Los Angeles, CA 90067,
(310) 772-8400, Attorney for Respondent Christopher Lee Armstrong
BERNARD J. ROSEN, 1717 Fourth Street, Third Floor, Santa Monica, CA 90401,
(310) 451-4577, Attorney for Respondent Freddie Mack
ERIC SCHNAPPER, University of Washington, School of Law, Of Counsel
View Table of Authorities
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part, "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
Section 242 of Title 18 U.S.C. provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, under color of any law, . . . willfully subjects any inhabitant of any
State to . . . different punishments, pains, or penalties, . . . by reason of
his color, or race, . . . shall be fined not more than $ 1000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both . . .
Section 994(d) of 28 U.S.C. provides in pertinent part, "The Commission
shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as
to the race . . . of offenders."
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
Documents and Tangible Objects. Upon request of the defendant the government
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, . . . or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense. . . .
Criminal Rule 17(c) provides in pertinent part:
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents, or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable
or oppressive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1) In 1992, respondents were arrested on charges of distributing cocaine base
(crack), illegal possession and use of handguns, and conspiracy. The criminal
conduct alleged was prohibited by both federal n1 and California law. n2 The
investigation which led to those arrests had been initiated by the Los Angeles
Police Department n3, and local police were involved throughout the
investigation as well as in several of the arrests. The United States
Attorney's Office for the Central District of California determined to
prosecute the respondents in federal court. Accordingly, on April 21, 1992,
respondents were indicted by a grand jury in that district.
n1 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) distribution of crack), 846 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (firearms).
n2 Cal. Health and Safety Code, §§ 11351.5, 11352.
n3 J.App. 75-76.
The decision to pursue federal charges against respondents was a momentous one.
Both the minimum and maximum sentences imposed by federal law are far higher
than those established by California law. The difference in potential sentence
varied with the charges and prior record, if any, of each of the defendants.
|
|
|
|
Potential Sentence n4 |
|
|
State Sentence |
Federal Sentence |
|
|
|
Armstrong |
3-9 years |
55 years to life |
Hampton |
3-14 years |
Mandatory life |
|
|
term |
Mack |
3-5 years |
10 years to life |
Martin |
3-10 years |
35 years to life |
Rozelle |
3-13 years |
45 years to life |
n4 California Health and Safety Code §§ 11351.5, 11352, 11370.1, 11370.2;
California Penal Code §§ 667.5, 1170.1; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 924(c).
The sentences in each case include enhancements, as provided by law, for prior
convictions and for firearms violations.
In practice, the differences are even greater because inmates in state prison
receive an unlimited amount of good time credit at the rate of one day of
credit for each day of good time n5, whereas good time credits for federal
inmates are capped at 54 days per year. n6 Thus a state inmate with a 5 year
sentence may serve as few as 30 months, while a federal prisoner with the same
sentence must serve at least 51 months.
n5 California Penal Code §§ 2931, 2933.
n6 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
(2) In July, 1992, respondents, all of whom are black, filed a motion alleging
that they had been selected for federal prosecution because of their race, and
seeking discovery. The motion requested an order directing the government to
provide respondents with "documentary evidence or information"
regarding four matters: (a) the race of other individuals prosecuted for crack
distribution either under federal statutes or "under state statutes
applicable to the distribution of cocaine base" (b) the race of
individuals who had been arrested in federal or joint federal-state
investigations, (c) the race of individuals who "use, distribute, or
possess with intent to distribute cocaine base", and (d) the standards
regarding which crack cases "will be accepted for federal prosecution and
when such cases will be referred or left to the state authorities for
prosecution." (Motion for Discovery and/or Dismissal of Indictment for
Selective Prosecution, p. 2-3.)
In support of the motion, respondents submitted a study compiled by the Federal
Public Defender of every crack case closed by that office in 1991 n7. The study
identified twenty-four such cases; in every instance the defendant against whom
the charges had been brought was black. (J.App. 68-70) At the September 8,
1992, hearing on the motion, counsel for the Federal Public Defender explained
that the office had sought without success to obtain comparable information
about state prosecutions, and that the motion asked that federal officials be
directed to produce such information because federal and state officials
"have access to one another's data."n8 Neither in its written
response to the motion for this information nor at the September, 1992, hearing
did the government dispute respondents' contention that the United States
Attorney, but not the respondents, had possession of or access to this
information.
n7 The study was based on several weeks of work by a paralegal who reviewed all
Federal Public Defender cases for the period. J.App. 153, 159.
n8 J.App. 156; see also id. at 146 ("it is considerably more difficult for
us to obtain information from law enforcement, and statistics that we believe
must be available simply by the nature of the U.S. attorney's office").
In our discovery motion, respondents specifically invited the government to
"offer some explanation" for the results of the study. n9 The written
response submitted by the United States Attorney, however, made no effort to do
so. At the hearing on the motion, the district judge expressed understandable
concern that "the Government hasn't offered any explanation at all as to
why . . . persons . . . being brought . . . to Federal court for these drug
offenses . . . all . . . are black."n10 Surprisingly, counsel for the
government responded that he had no idea why this had occurred. "I can't
explain why the public defender's office has only encountered black defendants
[in] crack cocaine cases - I would have no explanation for that." n11
n9 Motion for Discovery and/or Dismissal for Selective Prosecution, p. 11.
n10 J.App. 149.
n11 J.App. 150.
In the face of this response, the district judge granted the motion for the
requested discovery. n12 With regard to the requested documents or information
regarding the patterns of crack prosecutions, the court limited the discovery
required to a three year period from 1989 through 1991. n13 The judge
emphasized that "what the Court wants to know is whether or not there is
any criteria in deciding which of these cases will be filed in state court
versus Federal court and if so, what is that criteria." n14
n12 J.App. 150, 161-62.
n13 J.App. 153, 162.
n14 J.App. 162.
After the district judge had granted the motion from the bench, counsel for the
government for the first time argued that some effort might be required to
produce the statistical information; in response the district judge offered to
"give some guidance and make additional rulings if Government's Counsel
requests" narrowing or clarifying the discovery order. n15 In light of
that argument, the district judge repeatedly asked counsel for the government
to advise the court how much delay would be needed to comply with the discovery
order. n16 The district court also agreed to a request from the prosecution
that it be accorded an opportunity to submit a separate memorandum regarding
whether the government's criteria for selecting the narcotics cases to be filed
in federal court might be exempt from discovery. n17
n15 J.App. 152.
n16 J.App. 151, 158, 159, 162-63.
n17 J.App. 163.
(3) The United States moved for reconsideration of the district court's
discovery order. The United States Attorney represented to the District Court
that in any case in which there was so much as "one scintilla of
evidence"n18 of selective prosecution, the government would voluntarily
"initiate a full and complete investigation into it and would expend
whatever resources necessary", even if any discovery motion at issue
"failed to meet the legal requirement" for discovery. n19 The
government insisted, however, that a district judge could not order or conduct
such an inquiry into the same issue unless the defendant first met a high
evidentiary threshold. The government supported its motion with several
declarations and certain documentary material; respondents in turn introduced
additional declarations. These conflicting presentations raised several complex
factual disputes.
n18 J.App. 179.
n19 Government's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5 n.1.
The United States sought in several ways to attack the probativeness of the
initial Public Defender study. First, the government offered materials which it
argued showed that the all-black group identified by the study was the result,
at least in part, of a tendency of blacks to predominate in the sale of crack.
n20 Respondents in reply adduced two declarations stating that there were a
substantial number of non-black crack users and dealers. (J.App. 138, 140). One
of the declarations was from a member of the Board of Directors of the Los
Angeles Criminal Courts Bar Association Indigent Defense Panel, the primary
source of private court-appointed counsel for indigent state defendants in Los
Angeles County. Based on his own litigation experience, as well as on what he
had learned while serving as a Director of that panel, he concluded that there
were numerous non-black defendants being prosecuted in state court for crack
sales, many of whom had prior narcotics convictions. (J.App. 141). Second, an
Assistant United States Attorney asserted that his office had been able to
identify eleven non-black crack dealers who had been prosecuted in federal
court. n21 Respondents pointed out, in rebuttal, that all of the defendants
identified were Asian or hispanic, and that this survey concerned a decidedly
different pool (all federal prosecutions over a three year period) than the
Federal Public Defender Study (cases closed by that office in a single year).
n22 Third, the government relied on argument of counsel criticizing the scope
of that study. n23 Neither party objected to the admissibility of the other's
evidence; the dispute concerned the conflicting factual inferences to be drawn
from each. The district judge concluded that it would be inappropriate to hold,
"without expert testimony"n24, that the results of the Federal Public
Defender study stemmed from a paucity of non- black crack dealers.
n20 Counsel for the government summarized its evidence, and contentions, as
follows: "Part of the reason why there apparently seem to be so many black
defendants that are coming forth in these sort of prosecutions, is that the
particular type of narcotic is controlled, in the large part, by street gangs .
. . [that] operate out of areas that are very heavily minority, and so as a
result of that, oftentimes, the type of dealers . . . are from these street
gangs [whose] . . . membership . . . is fairly minority heavy, specifically
black African Americans." J.App. 170 (Emphasis added).
n21 J.App. 169, 201. The government identified five non- black defendants in a
three year period who had been represented by the Federal Public Defender, an
average of two per year.
n22 J.App. 180, 203.
n23 J.App. 201 (only a single year); Government's Motion for Reconsideration,
p. 8 (only Federal Public Defender cases).
n24 J.App. 217; see also J.App. 194 ("I think the expert is going to give
us the answers to all these questions"), 204 (noting the lack of "any
expert testimony".)
The United States also sought to show that the defendants in this case had been
selected for prosecution, not on the basis of race, but pursuant to
race-neutral selection criteria. First, the government offered a declaration of
the Los Angeles Police Department officer who had initiated the investigation.
The LAPD officer insisted that when the investigation of the suspected
Inglewood crack ring began, he "did not know" that any of the
suspects were black; he also acknowledged, however, that he did know that the
"overwhelming majority of crack dealers" in that geographic area were
black. n25 Second, the government offered a declaration from the ATF agent in
the case, who insisted the case was "recommended for prosecution"
because it met "the guidelines of the United States Attorney's
Office." (J.App. 78-79). That declaration, however, neither stated what
the "guidelines" were nor identified the person to whom the
recommendation had been made. The ATF agent's veracity was at that point under
attack in this very case. n26 Third, the government offered a declaration of
the Chief of the Criminal Complaints Section, who stated that the decision to
bring the instant case was made because it "met the general criteria
applied to all cases brought for consideration." (J.App. 80-81). The
declaration, however, did not state what the criteria were; instead, it simply
described seven different aspects of the instant case. Subsequently, counsel
for the government suggested, somewhat equivocally, that those seven items were
in fact the official criteria. n27
n25 J.App. 75-76. Officer Campbell's September 15, 1992, declaration to this
effect appears to be inconsistent with an affidavit which he had executed in
April, 1992, to obtain a search warrant in this case. That affidavit stated
that, when the officer was told by a confidential informant that a crack ring
was being operated in Inglewood by Chris Armstrong and several others,
"your affiant recognized these names from a search warrant your affiant
had executed on 1/17/92 . . . in Hawthorne, California. In the Hawthorne
location your affiant found . . . Chris Armstrong . . . . Your affiant showed
[the confidential informant] a photograph of Chris Armstrong, and [the
informant] identified the photograph. . . . "Search Warrant and Affidavit,
April 6, 1992, pp. 5-6.
n26 On June 10, 1992, the ATF agent, signed a statement provided to the defense
in discovery asserting that he had run a check of the background of the
government's key witness in this case, and that the witness had no criminal
record. (Statement of Jeffrey L. Cochran dated June 10, 1992.) On August 20,
1992, counsel for respondents subsequently introduced into evidence documents
showing that the agent had actually run a check on July 13, 1992, and that the
check revealed the witness had an extensive criminal record. (Defendant's
Opposition to Governments' Motion for Deposition, Exhibits C, E)
n27 J.App. 170-71.
Counsel for respondents argued that these ostensible criteria could explain
neither the pattern of prosecutions nor the decision to indict the defendants
in this case. They noted that a number of the defendants did not satisfy the
suggested criteria. n28 They also argued that several of the purported criteria
- such as use of a gun in connection with a narcotics sale, or sale by a
suspect with a criminal record - were applicable to large numbers of criminal
defendants who were prosecuted only in state court. n29 The trial judge
concluded that the government had failed to make clear the criteria, "if
there is any criteria, for bringing this case and others like it in Federal court"
n30, and expressed concern that none of the government's declarations had
indicated who had made the actual decision to commence the instant prosecution.
n31
n28 J.App. 179 (respondent Martin), 183 (respondent Hampton), see also id. at
181 (arguing explanations of government officials were inconsistent.)
n29 J.App. 182-83 (state narcotics defendants charged with use of guns); J.App.
141, par. 7 (state crack defendants with criminal records.)
n30 J.App. 217.
n31 J.App. 191.
Finally, there was an extended dispute at the December, 1992, hearing regarding
whether it was feasible for the defendants themselves to obtain the data which
the discovery order had required the United States to produce. First, the
government argued that respondents could themselves identify all the crack
prosecutions for the three years in question if they would "go sift
through" a list of several thousand criminal cases which the government
had produced n32; respondents objected that the list included all narcotics cases,
not only crack cases, and that the government was "deluging us with all of
the files to look through." n33 Second, the government argued " it
would be a very simple matter" for respondents to identify the race of all
the defendants in the listed cases n34; respondents objected that it would be
"virtually impossible" to do so, because racial identifications were
not contained in the publicly available records. n35 Respondents also noted
that the United States Attorneys' Office was ten times the size of the Federal
Public Defender, and thus better able to identify the documents or produce the
information at issue. n36 The district judge concluded that information about
"who was prosecuted . . . and where those persons were prosecuted is
within the peculiar knowledge of the Government and therefore . . . it would be
this Court's position that it is the Government that would have to provide that
evidence." n37 The judge also stressed that "one factor to be
considered . . . is . . . that if somebody has to get the information, it would
be less costly if the Government were required to provide it than if the
Defendants were required to try to obtain it." n38
n32 J.App. 176.
n33 J.App. 189.
n34 J.App. 176.
n35 J.App. 186-87.
n36 J.App. 193.
n37 J.App. 217.
n38 J.App. 190.
(4) While this case has been on appeal, the record has to a significant degree
been overtaken by events.
In 1993, under the auspices of the district court in a separate proceeding, a
year long study of federal and state prosecutions was undertaken by UCLA
professor Richard Berk regarding, inter alia, state crack prosecutions by the
Los Angeles County District Attorney. The study identified some 8,250 charges
in a twenty month period alleging sales of crack. 47% of these state charges,
some 3830 in total, were against non-black defendants. Non-blacks accounted for
42% of all crack distribution arrests during this period. n39 In the court of
appeals in the instant case, the United States suggested that crack dealers
prosecuted in state court might in some relevant respects differ from those
selected for prosecution in federal court, but did not question Berk's
conclusion that there are in fact a large number of non-black crack dealers
being prosecuted in state court in Los Angeles. n40
n39 A summary of the study was published in R. Berk and A. Campbell,
Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 Fed.
Sent. R. 36 (1993).
n40 Government's Response to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc, pp. 13-14.
Subsequent to the district court proceedings in the instant case, Assistant
United States Attorneys have in other cases in the Central District of
California made additional representations regarding the criteria which they
utilize in determining when to prosecute a narcotics case in federal court. On
August 6, 1993, the government asserted that membership in a gang was one of
the factors considered. (Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Re: Selective Prosecution, United States v. Washington, CR 91-632-TJH
(CDCA)). n41 However, on December 13, 1993, the government disavowed that
representation. (Hearing of December 13, 1993, CR 91-632-TJH) n42 Currently, it
appears the government is again asserting that alleged gang affiliation is a
criterion for federal prosecution. (Government's Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Compel Discovery filed October 6, 1995, United States v. Jamar, CR
95-432-WMB (CDCA)) n43 The United States initially asserted that there were no
written guidelines regarding these selection decisions. (Hearing of September
27, 1993, p. 18-33 CR 91-632-TJH), but subsequently acknowledged that there
were. (Hearings of October 28, 1993, p. 6-14 and December 13, 1993, p. 5-19, CR
91-632-TJH). n44
n41 See Appendix A.
n42 See Appendix A.
n43 See Appendix A.
n44 See Appendix A.
In February of 1995, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a Special
Report to the Congress on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy. Among its
conclusions regarding race and trends in cocaine use was a finding that of
those reporting use of crack cocaine in their lifetime, 65% were white, 26%
were black and 9% were Hispanic. n45
n45 United States Sentencing Commission Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine
and Federal Sentencing Policy at 39. (February 1995)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1) The discovery request in this case was for "documentary evidence or
information" dealing with certain specified issues bearing on respondents'
selective prosecution defense. It is governed by Rule 16(a)(1)(C), which
requires the United States to provide defendants with copies of documents
"material to the preparation of a defendant's defense."
The language of Rule 16 and well established discovery principles provide
meaning to and significant safeguards on the document discovery available in a
criminal case. Material documents may be obtained where, but only where, they
relate to a genuine defense, and are not part of a fishing expedition. The
genuineness of a defense can appropriately be gauged by the standard of Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires absent special
circumstances that factual allegations "have evidentiary support."
Discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) can appropriately be limited to such claims.
The determination of whether there is an evidentiary basis for the defense on
which a discovery request is grounded is a factual question to be made in the
first instance by the district court, and can be overturned on appeal only for
clear error. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Discovery
decisions by a district judge may be reversed only for a demonstrable abuse of
discretion.
(2) These general principles, not any special per se discovery rule, govern
discovery requests related to a defense of selective prosecution. Rule 16 does
single out certain types of discovery for special treatment, but discovery
concerning selective prosecution is not among them. The courts are not free to
engraft onto Rule 16 additional exceptions to its otherwise general language.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160
(1993).
The contours of the special discovery rule proposed by the United States are
far from clear. The government refers to its proposal, variously, as requiring
a "substantial and concrete basis", "solid credible
evidence", "reasonable likelihood", a "substantial
threshold showing", and "concrete[ness]." Adoption by this Court
of such an ill-defined special standard will generate increased uncertainty and
litigation. District judges have ample authority under the principles
applicable to all Rule 16 discovery requests to prevent unwarranted or unduly
burdensome discovery with regard to selective prosecution or any other defense.
(3) Unconstitutional selective prosecution can occur even where all or
virtually all of the individuals who violate a particular statute are members
of the same racial group. Government officials may not single out a particular
offense for harsher penalties or more vigorous investigation or prosecution
because those who commit that violation are likely to be members of a single
minority group. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
The Equal Pay Act is narrowly framed to prohibit intentional discrimination
only where there are men similarly situated to the female plaintiffs. But the
guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fifth Amendment, like the
unrestricted prohibition of intentional discrimination in Title VII, apply to
all invidiously motivated actions, regardless of whether there is a male or
non-minority comparator. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Solicitor General
previously urged adoption of a "similarly situated" requirement for
selective prosecution cases, but this Court properly declined to utilize that
standard.
(4) The district judge did not abuse her discretion in ordering the limited
discovery at issue in this case.
Counsel for respondents clearly had a colorable basis for asserting a defense
of selective prosecution. A study by the Federal Public Defender revealed that
all crack cases closed by that office in a one year period involved black
defendants. The United States does not contend that there was some obvious and
incontrovertible innocent explanation for that pattern. Several months after
the study was submitted, counsel for the government acknowledged that it then
had "no explanation" for the results. n46
n46 J.App. 150.
The United States does not question the materiality of the information sought
in the discovery request, and raises no issue regarding the scope of that
order. The government argued below that it would have been preferable for the
district judge to subpoena information from California officials, rather than
requiring the United States to produce documents or information. But this is
precisely the sort of discovery management issue consigned to the discretion of
the district courts.
ARGUMENT
Certain basic principles bearing on the instant appeal are not in dispute.
"The decision to prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" (U.S.Br. 17).
The Solicitor General does not, of course, argue that discovery can never be
ordered with regard to a claim of selective prosecution, and has not chosen to
raise in this Court any question about the scope of the particular discovery
ordered by the district court. The government appears to acknowledge that any
limitations on discovery should "still allow meritorious claims to
proceed." (U.S.Br. 25-26) The parties are in agreement that here, as in
any civil or criminal case, the decision of a district judge to order discovery
may be overturned on appeal only if there has been a demonstrable abuse of
discretion. (U.S.Br. 36-37).
The government, although opposing a discovery order directed to the United
States, consistently maintained in the courts below that the district judge in
this case could properly have issued a subpoena to California officials
directing them to produce information about cocaine base dealers prosecuted in
state court. n47 The United States also agrees that discovery may be ordered,
either on a sufficient showing of dissimilar treatment of "similarly
situated" individuals or where there are "direct admissions by
officials of discriminatory purpose." (U.S.Br. 15). The question presented
is whether these uncontroverted areas of judicial authority mark a rigid
boundary beyond which district judges are powerless to inquire whether an
investigation or prosecution was animated in whole or part by an
unconstitutional purpose.
n47 Government Motion for Reconsideration of Order for Discovery, p. 14
("information is... accessible to defendants by subpoena to local
authorities"); J.App. 201 ("Defense Counsel- . . . have as much
opportunity as the Government possibly could to subpoena information from the
state system"); Government Response to Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, p.6 n. 4 ("defendants in this case could
have pursued subpoenas to obtain state law enforcement records.")
I. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCOVER EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO A DEFENSE
OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
(1) This case concerns the scope of and procedure applicable to Rule
16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In terms modeled after
Civil Rule 34(a), Rule 16 provides that a criminal defendant may inspect and
copy any papers or documents "which are material to the preparation of the
defendant's defense." Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not require a defendant to
obtain a court order in order to discover such material, but imposes on the
government an obligation to "permit the defendant to inspect and
copy" any documents within the scope of the Rule. The discovery request at
issue in this case was expressly for "documentary evidence or
information." n48
n48 A number of documents in the government's possession were obviously within
the scope of the request. The actual indictments in federal crack cases would
have identified the defendants in those cases; the race of a defendant is
indicated in FBI arrest reports, Bureau of Prisons forms, and his or her NCIC
Record of Arrests and Convictions, a normal component of the discovery provided
by the government in any criminal case. The criteria utilized by the United
States Attorney in selecting cases for federal prosecution are set out in a
written guideline. See p.13, supra.
Provision for discovery of documents in criminal cases has existed since the
initial promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judicial
practice of providing a defendant with access to documents prior to trial dates
back to United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). The
scope of Rule 16 has been repeatedly broadened because of the Advisory
Committee's "view that an independent right of discovery for both the
defendant and the government is likely to contribute to both effective and fair
administration." (Notes of Advisory Committee to 1974 Amendments).
[A] system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible
amount of information with which to prepare their cases... is a salutary
development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties,
enhances the fairness of the adversary system.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973). Rule 16 does not constrict the
inherent authority of federal judges to order prosecutors to provide discovery
or otherwise disclose information which justice requires be made available to a
defendant. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) complements Rule 17(c), which authorizes a defendant to
subpoena for presentation at either trial or a Rule 12(b) hearing books, papers
or documents. Although the scope of the two rules is in some respects
different, Rule 16 permits a defendant to examine and evaluate documents which
he may then choose to subpoena. At a hearing on, for example, a claim of
selective prosecution, a Rule 17 subpoena is available to obtain appropriate documents.
Although Rule 17(c) contains no express requirement that documents be
"material", the Rule's prohibition against "unreasonable"
subpoenas is understood to encompass a requirement that the materials sought be
"relevant". United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974).
The discovery authorized by Rule 16 would in certain instances be
constitutionally required. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), mandates
disclosure by the prosecution of "evidence favorable to an accused . . .
that, if disclosed and used effectively, . . . may make the difference between
conviction and acquittal." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 687, 676
(1985). Evidence which would lead a court to sustain a selective prosecution
defense, thus preventing not only conviction but the risks of trial, obviously
is exculpatory in nature. The government's disclosure obligation under Brady is
greater when a defendant has made an express request for material. Id. at
681-82. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment is generally
available to provide "production of evidence needed . . . by the
defense." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) n49 . The inherent
obligation of the federal courts to ensure that their actions and orders do not
violate the Constitution encompasses the authority and at times an obligation
to conduct a factual inquiry necessary to assure, for example, that a defendant
has not been selected for prosecution or for imposition of a heavier punishment
because of his race.
n49 "This court would certainly be very unwilling to say that upon fair
construction the constitutional . . . right to obtain its process, to compel
the, attendance of witnesses, does not extend to their bringing with them such
papers as may be material in the defence." United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.
Cas. 30, 35 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
(2) Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is not, of course, a blanket authorization to defense
counsel to browse through the files of the Department of Justice. The only
documents which can be obtained are those "which are material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense." Where defense counsel has reason
to believe that a particular defense may be available to his or her client,
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is available to obtain relevant information in the hands of
the government. But Rule 16 cannot be utilized by defense counsel to rummage
through government files on the off chance that some additional defense may
turn up; such an inquiry would be the sort of fishing expedition prohibited by
criminal and civil discovery principles alike. Discovery under Rule 16 is not
permissible with regard to a defense which a defendant "has never alleged,
much less claimed to have evidence tending to show" exists. Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
The genuineness of a defense for which discovery is sought in a criminal
proceeding can be assessed by the same objective standard utilized to determine
the genuineness of other defenses or claims. The factual allegations underlying
an asserted defense must "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, [be] likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for . . . discovery." Rule 11(b)(2), Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro.
Where the information already available to a defense attorney is "sufficient
to lead a reasonable person to believe . . . that further inquiry on the
subject is warranted" (Pet. App. 97a), discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is
among the tools which, where otherwise appropriate, may be utilized to pursue
that inquiry.
The government may resist any discovery request which it can show is no more
than a fishing expedition. Where the United States declines on this basis to
produce a document sought under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), a court called upon to
resolve the ensuing discovery dispute can and should inquire whether the
purported defense to which the document relates is a genuine one. In making
that determination, a number of lower courts, and all members of the court
below, have suggested with regard to a selective prosecution defense that there
must be a "colorable basis" for asserting that defense before
discovery will be allowed. (Pet. App. 7, 19-21). The underlying question with
regard to discovery regarding a selective prosecution defense is the same as
for any other defense- whether the information available to defense counsel is
sufficient to lead a reasonable attorney to conclude that further inquiry on
the subject is warranted.
Even where a genuine defense is at issue, significant constraints may limit the
scope, and even the availability of discovery. Any document sought must be
"material" to the asserted defense. Under Rule 16, as with any
discovery request, a court may consider whether the party seeking discovery
already has reasonable access to the material at issue; the comparative
accessibility of a document to the respective parties is of palpable
importance. Rule 2 requires a federal judge to implement any discovery in a way
that minimizes cost and delay, focusing discovery on those items most readily
available and likely to lead most quickly to a resolution of the underlying
defense.
In any case in which discovery is sought under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), the government
may have a legitimate interest in protecting from disclosure some or all of the
information in the documents in question. Even where that interest falls short
of a legal privilege, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), this is a
consideration which a court can and should consider in responding to discovery
requests. In some instances, it may be appropriate to subject documents to a
protective order, to provide only redacted copies of the documents, or for the
district judge to review the materials in camera to ascertain what, if
anything, in them actually bears on the defense for which they are sought.
Where a party seeking such sensitive discovery has not exhausted other sources
of information, a district judge has discretion to deny discovery until the
defendant has done so. In addressing such discovery issues, a district court
should balance the importance of the government's legitimate need for
confidentiality with the defendant's right to prepare and present a defense.
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Kerr
v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). One useful method of doing so may be by
controlling the order in which discovery is permitted, initially allowing the
form of discovery that is least burdensome, and evaluating the propriety of
further discovery when the result of that first inquiry is known.
(3) Requests for discovery must ordinarily be addressed in the first instance
by the district court. Where, after affording the parties a full and fair
opportunity to be heard, the district judge fashions a practical solution to
the discovery issues presented by a selective prosecution defense, several
distinct considerations warrant considerable deference to that decision.
First, resolution of discovery issues "must necessarily be committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court since the necessity for the [discovery]
most often turns upon a determination of factual issues." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974).
The trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience
in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's
efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to
the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). To the extent that a
district court's decision turns on an assessment of the credibility of the
prosecutor's explanation of his actions, its findings are entitled to
particular deference. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n. 21 (1986); see
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-66 (1991).
Second, the resolution of discovery issues often goes to the heart of a trial
judge's responsibility under Rule 2 to manage the pretrial process with a
minimum of cost and delay. "Discovery questions are ordinarily reviewed
for abuse of discretion." United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F. 2d 935, 937
(9th Cir. 1992). These determinations often turn on intensely practical
considerations, the interrelation of known and sought after information, the
comparative accessibility of information to the various parties, and possible
alternative methods of resolving a particular factual dispute. "The exact
line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by
the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and
interests of the parties." Societe Nat. Ind. Aero, v. United States
District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
Third, the issues raised by a claim of selective prosecution by a particular prosecutor's
office will often be within the particular experience and expertise of a
federal district judge who sits in the district at issue, and can draw on his
or her "own day-to-day observations." United States v. Redondo-Lemos,
955 F. 2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1992). anything, in them actually bears on the
defense for which they are sought. Where a party seeking such sensitive
discovery has not exhausted other sources of information, a district judge has
discretion to deny discovery until the defendant has done so. In addressing
such discovery issues, a district court should balance the importance of the
government's legitimate need for confidentiality with the defendant's right to
prepare and present a defense. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring); Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394,
405 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). One useful method
of doing so may be by controlling the order in which discovery is permitted,
initially allowing the form of discovery that is least burdensome, and
evaluating the propriety of further discovery when the result of that first
inquiry is known.
(3) Requests for discovery must ordinarily be addressed in the first instance
by the district court. Where, after affording the parties a full and fair
opportunity to be heard, the district judge fashions a practical solution to
the discovery issues presented by a selective prosecution defense, several
distinct considerations warrant considerable deference to that decision.
First, resolution of discovery issues "must necessarily be committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court since the necessity for the [discovery]
most often turns upon a determination of factual issues." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974).
The trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience
in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's
efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to
the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). To the extent that a
district court's decision turns on an assessment of the credibility of the
prosecutor's explanation of his actions, its findings are entitled to
particular deference. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n. 21 (1986); see
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-66 (1991).
Second, the resolution of discovery issues often goes to the heart of a trial
judge's responsibility under Rule 2 to manage the pretrial process with a
minimum of cost and delay. "Discovery questions are ordinarily reviewed
for abuse of discretion." United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F. 2d 935, 937
(9th Cir. 1992). These determinations often turn on intensely practical
considerations, the interrelation of known and sought after information, the
comparative accessibility of information to the various parties, and possible
alternative methods of resolving a particular factual dispute. "The exact
line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by
the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and
interests of the parties." Societe Nat. Ind. Aero. v. United States
District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
Third, the issues raised by a claim of selective prosecution by a particular
prosecutor's office will often be within the particular experience and
expertise of a federal district judge who sits in the district at issue, and
can draw on his or her "own day-to-day observations." United States
v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F. 2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1992).
District judges are uniquely situated to observe possible discrimination in the
government's charging decisions. They have much more experience with the
policies and practices of the United States Attorney in their district than do
[appellate judges], and they are obviously in a better position to observe a
pattern of discrimination than are individual defendants.
(Pet. App. 86a).
Fourth, a district judge will bring to a selective prosecution dispute an
understanding of local circumstances that will at times be important to an
evaluation of the competing arguments and evidence. In this Court, the
government advances a necessarily generalized argument about whether it would
be reasonable to assume that crack is sold in Los Angeles by non-blacks.
(U.S.Br. 13-14, 29-30). A district judge who actually lives in Los Angeles, and
is familiar with the patterns of drug use in that area, is far better situated
to engage in an assessment of such arguments, involving as they do "a
blend of history and an intensely local appraisal" of the issues. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973).
II. NO SPECIAL STANDARDS ARE NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE IN RESOLVING
DISCOVERY REQUESTS RELATED TO, OR THE MERITS OF, A SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
DEFENSE
A. General Discovery Principles Adequately Protect the Government from
Improper Discovery
Not content with these general safeguards on the use of discovery in a criminal
proceeding, the United States asks this Court to adopt a special, more
stringent rule applicable only to discovery related to selective prosecution
issues. The sole practical effect of such a special rule would be to bar
discovery in circumstances which otherwise satisfy the normal standards of
materiality and reasonableness of scope.
The government's suggestion that this Court fashion such a special rule cannot
be squared with the language of Rule 16. The arguments that the government
advances for such a rule -- delay, risk of abuse, potential instrusiveness --
could be made to some degree with regard to any material sought by a criminal
defendant. Rule 16 does impose special discovery limitations with regard to
three specific types of evidence. First, Rule 16(a)(2) exempts from disclosure
"reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the
attorney for the government or other government agents in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case." Second, Rule 16(a)(2) sharply
limits the availability of "statements made by government witnesses or
prospective government witnesses"; the timing and availability of that
material is regulated with specificity by the Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Third, Rule 16(a)(3) precludes discovery of grand jury records save in certain
specified circumstances. Thus here, as in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, , 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993),
"the Federal rules do address in Rule [16] the need for" limiting
discovery of certain government materials, "but do not include among the
enumerated [limitations] any reference to" evidence related to selective
prosecution claims. 507 U.S. at , 113 S. Ct. at 1161. The
lower courts have repeatedly and correctly rejected similar efforts to engraft
onto Rule 16 exceptions not explicitly contained in the language of that Rule.
n50
n50 United States v. Scafe, 822 F. 2d 928, 935 (10th Cir. 1987) ("The
language of the rule reflects no intention that it be restricted to statements
to be used in the government's case in chief and we reject that restrictive
interpretation of the rule."); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F. 2d 1333,
1352-53 (D.C.Cir. 1974) ("we are unable to detect in this language [of
Rule 16] the limitation the government suggests.")
The government urges this Court to hold that discovery in selective prosecution
cases should be limited to "rare" circumstances. (U.S.Br. 26). The
framers of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, knew how to craft such a
discovery rule where they wished to do so; Rule 15(a) utilizes just such a
standard in limiting depositions to "exceptional circumstances." No
such restriction, however, is contained in Rule 16. "Expression unius est
exclusio alterius." Leatherman, 507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct.
at 1161. However persuasive the government's arguments might be if advanced in
support of proposals to amend Rule 16, they are insufficient to explain why
this Court should simply read into that Rule exceptions not found in its very
specific language.
Although the substance of the government's proposed special standard is quite
obscure, the United States clearly contemplates that, prior to any discovery
regarding selective prosecution, there would in each case be an evidentiary
hearing before the district court; at that hearing the defendant would put on
evidence which the government would have an opportunity to rebut, and the court
would then determine whether and what discovery should occur. Only if the
defendant prevailed at this mini-trial of his selective prosecution claim would
discovery be ordered by the district court. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). Precisely because Ninth Circuit caselaw
embodies just such a rule, discovery regarding selective prosecution must in
practice be initiated by motion; in the Central District of California it is
only in civil cases that parties are required by the local rules to request and
negotiate discovery issues before referring the matter to the district court.
n51 But this practice recreates the very process which the Rules were amended
in 1974 to abolish, resort to the court in the first instance. n52
n51 Local Rules, C.D.Cal., Civ. Rule 7.15.
n52 Prior to 1974 a defendant was required to obtain a court order in order to obtain
discovery in a criminal case. In recommending a change in this awkward
practice, the Advisory Committee explained: "The language of the rule is
recast from the 'court may order' or 'the court shall order' to 'the government
shall permit' or 'the defendant shall permit.' This is to make clear that
discovery should be accomplished by the parties themselves, without the
necessity of a court order unless there is dispute as to whether the matter is
discoverable. . . ." The language of Rule 16 is in contrast with Civil
Rule 35(a), which permits discovery of the physical or mental condition of an
individual only by court order. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1965).
Although the United States is emphatic in arguing for a special discovery
standard in selective prosecution cases, it is far from clear what that
standard is, or in what cases the government intends its standard to lead to a
result different than that which would ordinarily apply under Rule 16. The
Solicitor General describes his proposal, variously, as a "substantial and
concrete basis" (U.S.Br. 12, 19, 21, 25), "solid credible
evidence" (id. at 12, 24), "reasonable likelihood" (id. at 25),
"substantial threshold showing" (id. at 12, 20, 20 n. 1),
"concrete" (id. at 21, 25, 29), "reasonable grounds" (id.
at 26), and less than a prima facie case. Id. at 25. None of these alternative
formulations seems likely to provide useful guidance to district judges faced
with the eminently practical problems of supervising discovery, or to appellate
courts asked to decide whether a district court abused its discretion. Rather,
adoption by this Court of any of these vague admonitions would inevitably
engender increased uncertainty and litigation regarding when discovery should
and should not be permitted.
The government argues that without some special per se rule defendants raising
selective prosecution claims would be able to "circumvent" the
materiality requirement of Rule 16 (U.S.Br. 20 n.1), and would succeed in
embarking on "needless" and "unwarranted" "fishing
expedition[s]" leading to discovery of "irrelevant and
immaterial" information. (U.S.Br. 12, 20, 25). But there is no reason to
believe that district judges, who every day deal competently with discovery
issues in civil as well as criminal cases, would somehow be incapable in
selective prosecution claims of separating frivolous from legitimate discovery
requests. Federal district courts have for decades been alert to the
inappropriateness of unwarranted fishing expeditions; surely litigious anglers
will not run amok merely by asserting a claim of selective prosecution.
Doubtless there have been and will continue to be disputes under Rule 16
raising difficult factual and practical issues, but the Rules clearly
contemplate that those problems be addressed on a case by case basis. n53 The
proposed per se prophylactic rule advocated by the government for an entire
category of cases is inconsistent with the case specific determinations
contemplated by Rule 16.
n53 Rule 16(d)(1) provides in part: "Upon a sufficient showing the court
may at any time order that the discovery . . . be denied, restricted, or
deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party,
the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in
the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone."
The government also argues that without a special discovery limitation there
may be "abuses" (U.S.Br. 19), including "highly intrusive"
(id. at 20) or "massive" (id. at 20 n. 1) discovery or discovery
resulting in, or even intended to produce, unwarranted "delay".
(U.S.Br. 17, 19, 20, 20 n.1, 25). Again, however, all of these are concerns
that routinely arise with regard to any civil and criminal discovery; the
government does not claim that such issues are more common or intractable when
the evidence sought relates to selective prosecution. Here, as with any other
claim or defense, the Court can ordinarily "be confident that the district
court will not let discovery get out of hand." United States v. Adams, 870
F. 2d 1140, 1146 (6th Cir. 1989). In at least some circumstances, moreover, the
discovery limitation proposed by the United States would increase rather than
reduce delay. The United States, for example, maintains a computer list of all
narcotics prosecutions in the Central District of California; the same
information could be obtained by defense counsel by manually reviewing every
criminal file in the office of the District Court Clerk. To deny discovery of
that computer list would obviously increase greatly the delay involved in
resolving a selective prosecution claim.
The government offers no reason, moreover, why these concerns should result in
the denial of discovery in this case. The Solicitor General has not challenged
the scope of the particular discovery order in this case; he does not object
that the particular information sought is excessive, irrelevant, unduly
intrusive, or requested for purpose of delay. In the absence of any claim that
the scope of the discovery ordered in this case is inappropriate, it makes
little sense to suggest that that discovery order should nonetheless be
overturned because of the possibility that discovery orders in some other case
may be unduly burdensome or intrusive.
The Solicitor General urges this Court to forbid a federal judge, absent
special circumstances, from raising on his or her own any questions, or seeking
any information, about whether a criminal prosecution in his or her court has
been undertaken for racial or other unconstitutional reasons. "Judicial
inquiry into a prosecutor's reasons for bringing a prosecution should not even
begin unless there is a substantial and concrete basis for suspecting
unconstitutional action." (U.S.Br. 19). On the government's view, it would
have been impermissible for the district judge in this case even to inquire of
the attorney for the United States why the instant prosecution had been filed
in federal rather than state court, or why there appeared to be few if any
non-black defendants in federal cocaine base prosecutions. If the Solicitor
General is correct, a United States Attorney could and perhaps should flatly
refuse to answer such a question, instead admonishing the judge that the
government would respond only if the judge could first produce
"substantial and concrete" evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Such
a rule could all too easily require a federal judge to be a witting participant
in a serious constitutional violation.
Where, as here, the discretionary decision of a single government official may
well result in defendants in their early 20's with minimal records and
involvement spending 35 years to life in jail, such a bar to judicial scrutiny
would confer on an Assistant United States Attorney a power not unlike the
infamous lettres de cachet of eighteenth century France. n54 The broader
interest of the United States, we urge, lies instead in ensuring compliance
with the commands of the Constitution, even at the cost of some occasional
inconvenience. Where a district judge entertains suspicion of invidious racial
discrimination by the government, strict, not non-existent, judicial scrutiny
is required. As Judge Kozinski observed:
Where a district judge detects what he suspects may be an error seriously
affecting the rights of a criminal defendant, he must address the problem.
n54 See J.App. 179, 182-83, 193.
United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F. 2d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 1992). The
original panel decision below, on which the government otherwise relies,
properly insisted that a federal judge could initiate an appropriate inquiry
whenever "the district court develops a suspicion of unconstitutional
conduct." (Pet. App. 74a).
The government suggests that discovery regarding selective prosecution claims
should be severely limited because there is a presumption that federal
officials do not violate the Constitution. (U.S.Br. 18-19). But "it is
appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal
protection standards." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
No such constraint on discovery exists where a capital defendant asserts that a
federal prosecutor exercised peremptories on the basis of race in a particular
case. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) n55 Batson expressly rejected the
reasoning of Swain that a prosecutor might defend an equal protection claim
merely by "relying on a presumption that he properly exercised the State's
challenges." 476 U.S. at 91. It is undeniable that the government enjoys
broad discretion in determining which prosecutions to bring, but the Solicitor
General properly concedes that that discretion cannot be exercised on the basis
of race. Judicial solicitude for legitimate exercises of that discretion cannot
provide a basis for limiting inquiry into whether the exercise in a particular
case was in fact an impermissible one.
n55 See U.S.Br. 21 (claim of unconstitutional discrimination in refusal of
prosecutor to file motion for reduced sentence "should be treated no
differently from a prosecutor's other decisions.")
In framing a particular discovery order, a district court can and should
consider the degree to which its terms might inappropriately chill legitimate
prosecutorial activity, just as a court would consider whether a grand jury
subpoena might chill, for example, constitutionally protected free speech.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). But in
this case the government did not argue below, and does not insist here, that
the particular discovery order at issue presents such a threat. Indeed, the
government insisted below that most of the information sought was already a
matter of public record. Only evidence that a particular request is likely to
have a chilling effect, not a "generalized claim of confidentiality",
is sufficient to raise questions about the appropriateness of a particular
discovery order. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711, 713 (1974). The
government represented to the court below that it would probably open a
criminal investigation if there were "the slightest indication that an
[Assistant U.S. Attorney] in our office, or an agent or officer with whom we
were dealing, had charged a case, or prosecuted a case, or arrested an
individual for racial reasons." n56 In cases in which government officials
already face a threat of criminal prosecution, the possibility of disclosure of
information in a collateral criminal case is unlikely to have even a marginal
additional chilling effect.
n56 J.App. 197.
The Solicitor General suggests that special limitations on discovery related to
selective prosecution is needed to avoid, save in "rare" cases,
disclosure of evidence in the possession of the government which may bear on
such claims. (U.S.Br. 26) In the lower courts, however, it is the frequent practice
of the United States to oppose discovery motions by selectively disclosing to
the court, on its own initiative, government evidence which the United States
Attorney believes likely to persuade the court to deny the motion n57. In the
instant case, for example, the government proffered declarations about the
charging decision in this case, a documentary analysis of narcotics use and
sales, and a lengthy list of federal narcotics prosecutions, in a candid effort
to "short circuit the discovery issue." n58 The United States offered
similarly selected evidence in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 504
(1985). Thus the practical question raised by these cases is not whether the
government can shield all its information from discovery, but whether it can defeat
a discovery request by selectively disclosing to the court only the evidence
which tends to show that discovery is not appropriate. In some cases, of
course, the court may find that showing persuasive, but in other instances a
court might sensibly be induced to order discovery because of the nature of the
information the government had chosen to withhold, or because of the
unpersuasiveness of what may well have been the government's best evidence. In
general, "more accurate results will be obtained by placing all, rather
than part, of the evidence before the decision maker." Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 173 (1979).
n57 E.g., United States v. Gomez-Lopez, 62 F. 3d 304, 305 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Fares, 978 F. 2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Bourgeois, 964 F. 2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F. 2d 833, 836-37 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Aguilar, 883 F. 2d 662, 708 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.
2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Holmes, 794 F. 2d 345, 348 and n. 3
(8th Cir. 1986).
n58 J.App. 172.
We do not question the earnestness of the government's concern that excessive
and unwarranted discovery could impose "high costs on the criminal justice
system". (U.S.Br. 17) But "the very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts.
. . ." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). The Solicitor
General properly recognized a decade ago that
nothing can corrode respect for a rule of law more than the knowledge that the
government looks beyond the law itself to arbitrary considerations, such as
race, religion, or control over the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
rights, as the basis for determining its applicability. n59
n59 Brief for United States, Wayte v. United States, No. 83-1292, p. 22
(quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F. 2d 1207, 1209 (2d Cir. 1974)).
"In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for
our criminal justice system and the rule of law", Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. at 99, are imperiled by the appearance of racial discrimination in that
system. n60 In the United States today public confidence in the racial fairness
of the criminal justice system is already badly shaken; in Los Angeles that
confidence has virtually collapsed. When a large portion of the population
believes that system is seriously tainted by racial discrimination, the public
cooperation on which the system depends -- from witnesses as well as jurors --
is at risk. The facts which prompted the instant discovery request -- that all
or virtually all defendants prosecuted for cocaine base sales by federal
authorities are black -- is not some state secret; a randomly selected
pedestrian at the corner of Florence and Normandie in South Central Los Angeles
could have accurately predicted the result of the Federal Public Defender's
study. The continued resistance of the Department of Justice to full and fair
discovery and public hearing on such issues will in the long term impose on the
criminal justice system a cost immeasurably greater than the passing
inconvenience of responding to a discovery request.
n60 "Everyone concerned with the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
-- and with the willingness of all citizens to accept its judgment as fair and
final -- must be troubled by allegations of unfairness, particularly racial
discrimination." U.S. Sentencing Commission, Materials Concerning
Sentencing for Crack Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim. Law. Rep. 2127, 2131 (May 31,
1995).
B. Proof of the Existence of "Similarly Situated"
Non-Minorities Is Not a Necessary Element of a Selective Prosecution Defense
(1) The criminal justice system, necessarily and properly, is permeated by
circumstances affording, and often requiring, law enforcement officials to make
choices. The police officer walking a beat decides daily what infractions to
pursue, and which in prudence should be overlooked. Federal or state task
forces select particular geographic neighborhoods to target for investigation.
Authorities may focus on particularly visible criminal activity, or pursue
covert but possibly more far reaching conspiracies. Officials who come across a
drug dealer may opt for an immediate arrest, or try to arrange for larger sales
which will lead to far increased penalties. Where, as is often the case, the
same criminal act violates both federal and state laws, federal officials must
select those defendants against whom federal charges will be filed, and which
suspects should be left to state authorities. All of these selections, if
properly made, may enhance the overall effectiveness of law enforcement; but
any of these decisions, if made on the basis of race, would be
unconstitutional.
One manner in which law enforcement officials could discriminate would be by
making improper distinctions among defendants with identical criminal histories
who had committed the very same crime. Thus Equal Protection would clearly be
violated if the government were, for racial reasons, to target or prosecute
blacks who sold more than 50 grams of crack, while ignoring whites who sold the
same quantity of the same drug. E.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 990 F. 2d
472, 477 (9th Cir. 1993) (claim that government intentionally "targeted
predominantly black and hispanic neighborhoods.") n61 But clearly that is
not the only method in which invidious discrimination can occur. If in a
particular locality cocaine base were actually used and sold only by blacks,
while cocaine powder were used and sold only by whites, the Constitution would
certainly be violated if the government, for racial reasons, prosecuted even
low level crack dealers but only major powder distributors, chose to target its
investigations at crack violations, or made a greater effort to induce crack
dealers to sell large quantities to federal agents. Equal protection principles
preclude the government from targeting a particular type of criminal act for
greater scrutiny, harsher penalties, or more vigorous prosecution because most
or all of the individuals who commit that offense are racial minorities. See
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226-32 (1985).
n61 See United States v. Bishop, 959 F. 2d 820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1992) (equal
protection violated by peremptory challenge based on ethnic composition of
neighborhood in which prospective juror resides).
As these examples illustrate, unconstitutional discrimination can certainly
occur even though all the individuals who violate a particular statute, or who
do so in a particular manner, may belong to a single racial or ethnic group.
Even if Christopher Lee Armstrong were the only person ever
suspected of selling crack in the Central District of California, federal
officials would undeniably violate the Constitution if they targeted,
investigated, arrested, or selected him for prosecution because he was black or
Catholic or a Republican.
(2) The government suggests that the existence of "similarly
situated" whites is a necessary element of a selective prosecution claim.
This argument erroneously confuses one possible method of proving intentional
discrimination with the nature of intentional discrimination itself.
As this Court has repeatedly held, what equal protection prohibits, absent a
compelling governmental interest, is governmental action taken on the basis of
race. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The pivotal issue in such a
discrimination case is the motive of government official or officials involved.
Often, of course, one of the most useful evidentiary tools for discerning
motive is a comparison of the treatment of similarly situated minority and
non-minority individuals. Thus, where voting officials apply a literacy test
with draconian harshness to black citizens, rejecting even those with college
degrees, while happily registering comparable or even less educated whites, the
invidious motive at work will be entirely obvious. Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). But that assuredly is not the only type or method of proving
discrimination. The Constitution forbids a state registrar from rejecting even
a single black registrant on the basis of race, even if his or her particular
background be totally unique, or from adopting a particular racially neutral
practice because, even though applied equally to "similarly situated"
blacks and whites, it would fall more harshly on racial minorities. Hunter v.
Underwood; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1965).
This distinction is a familiar one in employment discrimination litigation.
Federal anti-discrimination laws forbid employers to discharge an employee
because of his or her race. Where a discharged employee contends that he or she
was the victim of unlawful discrimination, one method of establishing that
claim would be to show that another employee, of a different race, was treated
more leniently despite having committed the identical offense. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 275, 278 (1976).
But federal law also protects from race-based dismissals workers whose
positions, circumstances or alleged transgressions happen to be unique. See,
e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993). Similarly, under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a defendant need not show that a
prospective juror allegedly removed on the basis of race was "similarly
situated" to some white juror; the background and circumstances of
individual jurors is almost always to some extent unique.
It would, of course, be possible to frame a law which expressly permitted
intentional discrimination in the absence of "similarly situated"
comparators. The Equal Pay Act is just such a statute, prohibiting gender based
wage discrimination against women only where there are men performing for
higher wages "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (Emphasis added). Thus where
only women work in "a unique position", the Equal Pay Act does not
prohibit an employer from setting a low wage for that position because it
harbors animus towards female workers. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 179 (1981). Even in the absence of any similarly situated men,
however, that same act would violate Title VII, whose prohibition against
intentional discrimination, like the Constitution, contains no such limitation.
Id.
Adoption of the government's proposed rule would lead at times to incongruous
results. If, for example, a prosecutor adopted a racially motivated practice of
prosecuting even small time non-white drug dealers, while charging only those
whites who were major dealers, whether the conviction of a particular small
time non-white dealer was unconstitutional would depend on what types of drugs
happened to be sold by whites in the area. Thus, the convictions of minority
powder cocaine or methamphetamine dealers might be invalid, while the
convictions of minority crack or black tar heroin dealers would be perfectly constitutional.
See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 179.
This Court has previously rejected the United States' suggestion that the
selective prosecution defense be limited to cases in which there were
"similarly situated" individuals receiving more lenient treatment. In
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the lower courts had imposed on
selective prosecution defenses a two-part standard, requiring both proof of an
unconstitutional animus and proof that there were others "similarly situated"
who had not been prosecuted. 470 U.S. at 605-606. The Solicitor General urged
this Court in Wayte to adopt that same special standard. n62. This Court
refused to do so, instead utilizing the requirement of "ordinary equal
protection standards" which require a defendant to show "a
discriminatory effect and . . . a discriminatory purpose." 470 U.S. at
608. This Court's rejection of the proposed requirement of differing treatment
of "others similarly situated," in favor of a broader standard of
"discriminatory effect," reflected an understanding that
discrimination might occur against an individual or group of individuals whose
particular situations were not similar to anyone else's.
62 Brief for the United States, No. 83-1292, pp. 23-29. The government urged
this Court to hold that proof of similarly situated unprosecuted individuals
was an essential "prong" of a selective prosecution claim, id. at 26,
and that absent proof of that prong it would be improper for a court even to
inquire whether a particular prosecution was the product of an invidious
motivation. Id. at 26.
This Court's decision in Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905), does not
support the government's position. The petition for writ of habeas corpus in
that case contained no allegation of any invidious motive on the part of local
officials, nor any claim that the statute at issue was adopted n63, enforced,
or enforced with particular vigor because those likely to violate the law were
primarily Chinese. The sole allegation of the petition -- that Chinese persons
alone had been prosecuted under the ordinance -- asserted neither the existence
of a discriminatory purpose nor the existence of a discriminatory effect.
Applying a stringent pleading requirement quite unlike the standards subsequently
adopted by the Federal Rules, this Court in 1905 held that that single
allegation was insufficient. 198 U.S. at 507-08. Although Ah Sin indicated the
petition would have been sufficient if it had also contained an allegation that
there were non-Chinese offenders who went unprosecuted, the Court did not
suggest that this was the only additional allegation which would have remedied
the defect in that pleading. n64
n63 At the time Ah Sin was decided, the decisions of this Court precluded Ah
Sin from advancing any challenge to the purpose of the law at issue. See Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904).
n64 The ordinance in Ah Sin in essence forbade the possession of cards, dice or
dominoes behind locked doors. It is entirely inconceivable that no white
persons engaged in such behavior in the rambunctious society of turn of the
century San Francisco. Were the government today to attack the sufficiency of a
pleading by hypothesizing the possibility of such white fastidiousness in the
aptly labeled Wild West, that argument would be dismissed as an "ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509
(1975).
(3) To the extent that a defendant argues that improper invidious distinctions
were made within a particular group of offenders, such as crack dealers, the
comparative treatment of other members of that group would of course be
important evidence. A district court clearly should consider that element in
resolving this type of selective prosecution defense on the merits, and
undeniably could do so in deciding whether to order discovery. The government
urges this Court to go further and announce a rigid rule that discovery cannot
be ordered in such a case unless there is either substantial evidence as to the
composition of the group of violators not prosecuted, or a confession by the
United States Attorney that the prosecution decision was the result of
invidious discrimination. (U.S.Br. 15). In the latter case, of course, there
would be no need for discovery; such a confession alone would require dismissal
of the improperly motivated charges. No basis exists for imposing the former
requirement as a per se condition of discovery in every case, regardless of its
circumstances.
The Solicitor General insists that this requirement imposes no significant
barrier to any meritorious claim because detailed data about offenders not
prosecuted by the United States is always "readily accessible to the
public." (U.S.Br. 35; see also id. at 15, 25-26) n65. In any individual
case in which such information was actually readily available to a defendant,
the United States would have no need for the proposed per se rule, since the
government could on that basis urge the district court to defer discovery in
that particular case until the information had been brought forward by the
defendant. The Solicitor General asks this Court to adopt a prior an
irrebuttable presumption that such information will be available in every case;
the primary impact of such a rule, of course, will be in precisely those cases
in which the presumption is incorrect, and in which the presumption would
operate to preclude a defendant with a possibly meritorious case from showing
that in his or her case, contrary to the Solicitor General's somewhat breezy
assumption, the information in question was in fact difficult or impossible to
obtain n66.
n65 In 1985 the Solicitor General made a similar argument in urging this Court
to adhere to the harsh rule of Swain v. Alabama. "We are unpersuaded that
Swain imposes an unduly difficult burden on defendants seeking to prove
systemic exclusion. If the pernicious practice of racially-motivated exclusion
in fact prevails . . . defense counsel could relatively easily keep the records
necessary to make the required proof. . . . There are cases in which such
statistics have been collected and produced . . . [Defense attorneys] are well
situated to collect the requisite statistics." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae, Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263, pp. 6, 26-27. In Batson, this
Court concluded, to the contrary, that Swain had established a crippling
standard of proof, and Swain had as a consequence been understood in practice
to sanction intentional discrimination on the basis of race.
n66 Requiring defendants in such cases to adduce, without the aid of discovery,
statistically persuasive evidence that similarly situated whites had not been
prosecuted would create the sort of "crippling burden of proof"
established under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), and rejected by this
Court in Batson. Batson noted that, despite the availability of discovery under
Swain, requiring a defendant to investigate the circumstances of a substantial
number of other cases could create very real "practical
difficulties", and that "the burden would be insurmountable" if
available government files did not contain racial identifications. 479 U.S. at
92 n.17.
The instant case presents just such a situation. In the district court
respondents made a persuasive showing that information about state
prosecutions, or about the race of federal or state defendants, could not
readily be obtained. n67 Respondents' discovery requests were therefore
expressly framed to obtain from the United States whatever information or
documents it had regarding the race of state defendants or crack distributors
in general. The United States did not seriously dispute that factual contention
in the district court, and does not address here the fact-specific arguments
made below. Instead, the Solicitor General urges this Court to hold that it is
somehow impossible that comparative information would ever be difficult to
obtain in the Central District of California or anywhere else in the nation,
and that it therefore would be unnecessary and improper for a district judge
ever to consider evidence intended to demonstrate the existence of a problem
which, the government urges, could not possibly arise.
n67 "Since the pertinent records relating to cases in the geographical
area covered by the Central District may well be scattered across seven
different county district attorney's offices, seven separate sheriff's
departments, and a large number of independent local police departments, the
defendants would have an almost impossible time compiling data on their
own." Pet. App. 101a n. 6.
If, of course, comparative information were in fact always readily available,
it would be of little consequence if the courts were to adopt such a conclusive
presumption of availability, and then place on the United States, rather than
on the defendant, the nominal burden of bringing that evidence into court. That
is precisely the result of the holding of the en banc court below that all
races will be presumed to commit any particular offense unless the government
adduces evidence to the contrary. (Pet. App. 19a). If such information were
readily obtainable, the Department of Justice would presumably welcome an
invitation to bring forward evidence which might strongly support its position.
Instead of blithely accepting a requirement that it produce this allegedly
"readily available" information, however, the government warns that
the burden -- nominal when imposed on an indigent individual defendant -- would
cause horrific problems when imposed on the Department of Justice. See U.S.Br.
19-20, 35, Pet. App. 17, 23 n.3, 24, 26.
In reality, of course, the availability of data on the group of non-prosecuted
offenders will vary from case to case; more importantly, so will the
comparative ability of the United States Attorney and defense counsel to obtain
the information. The direction of Rule 2 that Rules of Criminal Procedure be
construed to avoid "unjustifiable expense and delay" admonishes trial
judges to place the burden of producing such relevant information on the party
able to do so with the least cost and delay. That admonition is particularly
important where, as the district judge noted, the federal government will foot
the bill either way, paying for the time of either the United States Attorney,
the Federal Public Defender, or, at a far higher hourly rate, private counsel
appointed to represent indigent defendants. n68 Where, for example, the United
States has computer data available at the touch of a keyboard, no district
judge would require -- as would the government's proposed rule -- that defense
counsel recompile the same data by hand. n69 The government conceded in the
court of appeals that "certain law enforcement data is undoubtedly more accessible
to the government" n70; "most of the relevant proof in selective
prosecution cases will normally be in the Government's hands." United
States v. Heidecke, 900 F. 2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1990). n71
n68 J.App. 189-90.
n69 "Nearly all of the data necessary to a showing of selective
prosecution are far less accessible to the defendants than to the federal
government. Federal and county law enforcement authorities cooperate closely in
these cases, and both levels of government are involved in the decision whether
to bring charges in federal or state court. . . . Given that the federal and
local authorities work so closely investigating these crimes, the federal
government probably already has records of the cases in which it declined to
initiate federal prosecution. In any event, it is surely much easier for the
United States Attorney's office to get this information from state officials,
from the county prosecutor's offices, and from local police departments, than
it is for criminal defense lawyers." J.App. 100a-101a, n. 6.
n70 Governments's Response to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc, p. 6 n.4.
n71 That defendants will often face difficulty in proving systemic
discrimination by a prosecutor was explained by Justice Goldberg. "[The
prosecution is] in the better position to develop the facts. The defendant is a
party to one proceeding only, and his access to relevant evidence is obviously
limited. The State is a party to all criminal cases and has greater access to
the evidence. . . ." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 240 (1965)
(dissenting opinion).
The absence of comparative data is, of course, one of the factors which a court
could consider in determining whether to permit discovery. The government
concedes that discovery could in at least some circumstances be ordered without
such evidence -- whenever the United States Attorney confessed in court that he
had sought a harsher penalty on account of race, a confession that might entail
potential criminal liability. There is, however, no reason to insist that a
colorable showing of materiality be made in this or any other particular
manner. On the government's view, where a written confession of just such an
unconstitutional purpose was in the United States Attorney's files, but no
comparative data could be obtained by the defendant, a district court would be
powerless to order disclosure of that very confession.
In the intensely practical task of managing discovery, district judges must be
accorded considerable discretion to decide in what direction discovery would
most effectively proceed. The government proposes that in every selective
prosecution case a defendant must first address any relevant issue about
similarly situated offenders, and in doing so may resort to subpoenas of state
information, but not to discovery of federal information. Surely, however,
where the United States has the same information as state authorities, a
district judge could and ordinarily should direct the United States to produce
it, if only because the United States, and not the state, is a party to the
proceeding. Regardless of the location of such comparative data, a district
judge might sensibly choose to focus discovery on other issues where the
information was more accessible or more likely to be dispositive.
C. No Special Heightened Standard of Proof Should Be Applied to a
Defense Based on Racial Discrimination by Prosecutors or Other Law Enforcement
Officials
The government urges this Court to hold that where a defendant asserts that he
was selected for prosecution on account of his race, or for some other
constitutionally impermissible reason, the defendant can only prevail by
establishing that factual assertion with "exceptionally clear proof."
(U.S.Br. 18). At this point in the instant case, of course, consideration of
that issue would be premature. The district court has not reached the merits of
respondents' claims, or even scheduled a hearing on them. Questions regarding
the quantum of proof necessary to establish a selective prosecution claim
cannot fairly be said to be encompassed by the Question Presented regarding
discovery.
This Court's decision in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) is
dispositive of the government's contention. Wayte makes clear that "it is
appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal
protection standards." 470 U.S. at 608. In an ordinary equal protection
case a plaintiff alleging intentional racial discrimination need only
demonstrate that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In assessing the
selective prosecution claim in Wayte, the Court applied equal protection
decisions concerning employment discrimination, 470 U.S. at 608-09 (citing
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) and
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)), housing discrimination, 470 U.S. at
609 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977)), and jury discrimination. 470 U.S. at 608-09 (citing Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).)
The exercise of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor, like decisions to
initiate a prosecution, involves a substantial degree of discretion, yet this
Court has applied ordinary standards of proof in evaluating claims that a
prosecutor utilized a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror on
the basis of race. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), this Court
overturned Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), because the special stringent
evidentiary requirements of Swain were "inconsistent with standards that
have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the
Equal Protection Clause." 476 U.S. at 93. In delineating the standard of
proof applicable to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, Batson, like
Wayte, relied on Equal Protection decisions related to discrimination in
employment, housing, and jury selection, as well as Title VII case law. 476
U.S. at 93-95 and n. 18. Similarly, no special standard of proof is applied in
evaluating a claim that a prosecutor vindictively increased the charges against
a defendant in retaliation for the exercise of some constitutional right.
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n. 12 (1982).
The reference in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987), to a need for
"exceptionally clear proof" is easily distinguishable from the
instant case. First, many of the decisions at issue in McCleskey had been made
by jurors, whom it was impracticable to question about their motives, and the
questioning of whom has traditionally been presumed inappropriate absent quite
extraordinary circumstances. Prosecutors, on the other hand, are routinely
asked by courts to explain their actions, e.g. Batson, and here, as in other
cases, the government has volunteered explanations for its actions, resisting
only discovery which might tend to undermine those explanations. Second, the
patterns evident in McClesky involved literally thousands of jurors over a
period of years scattered across an entire state, individuals who could not
conceivably have acted with in consultation or with a conscious common plan. A
claim of selective prosecution, on the other hand, like a claim of systematic
discrimination under Swain v. Alabama, involves at most a far more limited
number of prosecutors, all working for the same agency and presumably
responsive to similar pressures and incentives.
III. THE DISTRICT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
LIMITED DISCOVERY IN THIS CASE
This case palpably presents the type of circumstances in which a district judge
has the discretion to order an appropriate form of discovery.
The government did not contend below, and does not argue here, that the
discovery request initiated by the Federal Public Defender was a mere fishing
expedition. The fact that all crack cases closed by that office for an entire
year involved black defendants provided counsel for respondents with a
colorable basis for believing that a selective prosecution defense would be
available, and assuredly warranted further inquiry. It is difficult to see how
a responsible defense attorney would have failed to do so. While subsequent
discovery and litigation will undoubtedly throw more light on this singular
circumstance, the United States does not contend that there was some innocent
explanation so obvious to all that counsel for respondents could not seriously
have believed that discrimination might be at work. On the contrary, almost two
months after respondents presented this study along with their motion for
discovery, the Assistant United States Attorney responding to the motion
confessed that he still had "no explanation" for the facts which it
revealed. (J.App. 150).
Neither does the Solicitor General suggest that, once counsel for respondents
had seen the material offered by the government in its motion for
reconsideration, the only reasonable conclusion they could have drawn was that
there was no longer any colorable basis for pursuing a selective prosecution
defense. To the extent that the government was arguing that virtually all crack
dealers in the area were black, the personal experience of one of respondents'
attorneys was to the contrary. Although the government proffered declarations
from two law enforcement officials denying any racial motive, prior filings in
this case raised serious questions about the reliability of both officials.
The United States does not suggest that the type of discovery sought below was
not material to respondents' selective prosecution claim. On the contrary, both
in the courts below and in this Court the government's arguments have focused
on the very type of information which respondents sought to obtain through
discovery. In this Court the Solicitor General stresses the importance of
evidence concerning non-blacks prosecuted in state courts in the Central
District of California; that was one of the very items of information sought by
the discovery request. The government relies on its own undeniably anecdotal
information about the race of federal crack defendants, and suggests the scope
of the Federal Public Defender's presentation was too limited (U.S.Br. 27, 32
n.3); production of documents providing more comprehensive information about
these very issues was one of the central purposes of the requested discovery.
The United States obviously does not dispute the relevance of its own purported
selection criteria to a determination of whether the decision to prosecute
respondents had a non-racial basis.
The district judge properly considered the comparative ability of the parties
to obtain information of obvious relevance, and assessed the relative costs
involved. (J.App. 189-90). In this Court, the Solicitor General argues
repeatedly, albeit without explanation, that respondents had ready access to
information about the number and racial distribution of crack defendants in
state court. (U.S.Br. 26, 35). But that is the very factual argument which
three years ago was made by the United States Attorney and rejected by the
district court. The government makes no assertion that the lower court's finding
on this issue was clear error.
The trial judge's familiarity with local circumstances, and her 12 years on the
federal bench, were of obvious importance in evaluating the material submitted
by the United States Attorney and relied on in this Court by the government.
The lead police and ATF investigators, for example, insisted that they had no
idea of the race of the individuals involved when they began their
investigation of a suspected crack ring in Inglewood; any judge in Los Angeles,
however, would understand that law enforcement officials would know full well
that an investigation targeted at Inglewood, rather, for example, than at the
hispanic community in Van Nuys, or the white suburb of Simi Valley, would lead
to the arrest of black suspects. The government suggests that the pattern of
federal prosecutions could be explained by considering the weight of the
narcotics which a suspect was charged with distributing. (U.S.Br. 35-36 n.4).
But a federal judge sitting in the Central District of California has
substantial first hand experience, which appellate judges would not, with which
to evaluate such a claim, drawing, for example, on her knowledge of the
comparative size of the sales with which black crack dealers and white powder
cocaine dealers were being charged in that federal court.
The primary thrust of the government's argument in this Court is that
respondents did not properly compare the pattern of federal prosecutions with
the treatment of "similarly situated" non-blacks. But over the course
of this litigation the government has had a series of quite different positions
as to which other offenders should be regarded as "similarly
situated." In August, 1992, the government filed a memorandum insisting
the proper comparison group was non-black cocaine base dealers. n72 A month
later, the government filed a second memorandum insisting, to the contrary,
that "the proper universe of similarly situated defendants in this case is
all narcotics offenders indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846." n73 In the
Ninth Circuit, the government suggested to the original panel that "the
proper universe of similarly situated defendants" was "generally all
those offenders that have violated the same criminal statute . . . all federal
narcotics offenders indicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846." n74 In its
brief to the en banc court, however, the government asserted that a
"similarly situated individual" would be one "with a similar
criminal background and similar offense conduct." n75 In this Court, the
government advances three alternative definitions of "similarly
situated": (a) individuals "eligible for prosecution" (U.S.Br.
14, 32, 37) (b) persons guilty of "dealing in crack" (U.S.Br. 30) and
(c) persons who distribute "more than 50 grams of cocaine and . . . use .
. . firearms." (U.S.Br. 35-36 n.4). The district court cannot fairly be
faulted for declining to address, as a precondition of any discovery, a
fact-bound issue regarding which the government's own position continues to
evolve, or for failing to require respondents to present in 1992 a study that
took into consideration "criteria" yet to be delineated.
n72 Government's Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Discovery, p. 6.
n73 Government's Motion for Reconsideration of Order for Discovery, p. 10. The
government also argued, "In contrast, defendants have asked this Court to
adopt an overly narrow definition of similarly situated law breakers to be
crack cocaine offenders, rather than the appropriate universe of all federal
narcotics offenders in that same time period." Id.
n74 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 16 n. 7.
n75 Appellant's En Banc Brief, p. 6.
The record, of course, does contain declarations indicating that there are
indeed a substantial number of non-black crack dealers. The government asserts
without explanation that the district court did not rely on this information.
(U.S.Br. 28 n.2). The government, however, made no such assertion in the court
of appeals, and the panel decision held that the district judge had relied on
this evidence. (Pet. App. 82a-83a). In her January 5, 1993, bench opinion, the
district judge stressed that she had "reviewed all of the evidence offered
by all parties" n76, and singled out only another item of evidence offered
by respondents as not persuasive. n77 The government also contends that the
court of appeals did not base its ruling on this evidence (Reply Brief for the
United States, 4 n. 1); in fact the en banc court expressly relied on that
evidence. (Pet. App. 22a-23a, 30a). n78
n76 J.App. 218.
n77 Id.
n78 The government also argues that this evidence is insufficient to provide a
basis for the discovery order, criticizing it as "vague, conclusory, and
impressionistic hearsay." (U.S.Br. 35 n. 4). This fact-bound evidentiary
issue is not fairly encompassed by the Question Presented.
The government advanced no objection to the form or sufficiency of this
evidence when it was offered in the district court, and it is thus precluded
from raising such objections on appeal. (Pet. App. 98a-99a and n.5). The Reed
declaration was based in part on personal experience on the bar referral panel
which provided counsel for indigent state defendants. (J.App. 140-41). In this
Court, on the other hand, the government invokes an affidavit of the DEA Public
Information Officer that is to a substantial degree hearsay. (J.App. 71-74)
("My knowledge is based upon numerous reports and publications . . . and
attending various seminars, meetings, lectures, and conventions.")
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990), does not limit
the type of evidence on which a district court can rely in exercising its
discretion to order discovery. Triplett concerned the quantum of evidence
necessary to warrant a determination that a nation-wide administrative system mandated
by Congress is unconstitutional. Far from attacking the constitutionality of
any federal statute, respondents seek to enforce the prohibitions against
discrimination in punishment embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 28 U.S.C. §
994(d). The instant appeal concerns only the practices of a particular United
States Attorney's office, and will resolve, not the merits of a constitutional
claim, but merely the availability of discovery that bears on that claim.
Respondents seek discovery for the very purpose of obtaining more "solid
and credible evidence" to sustain that defense.
The government suggests, in the alternative, that respondents should have
introduced a study that took into consideration whether non-black narcotics
defendants had distributed more than 50 grams of crack or had used guns. But a
central purpose of the discovery request and order in this case was to obtain
from the government an official articulation of its prosecution criteria,
against which the government's actions could be assessed. It makes no sense to
require respondents, as a condition of obtaining that discovery, to guess in
advance what criteria the government would announce years later on appeal, or
to conduct a study based on the very sort of information which respondents needed
discovery to obtain. The government does not even suggest that the information
necessary to prepare this sort of proposed study, such as data on the quantity
of narcotics distributed by state and federal defendants, was in any way
available to respondents.
CONCLUSION
This case arises out of the decision of a responsible and experienced federal
judge to permit a limited inquiry into a single claim of racial discrimination
in the criminal justice system. That the order in question was issued by the
United States District Court in Los Angeles is neither unimportant nor
necessarily coincidental. Elimination of racial discrimination from the
criminal justice system is the overarching equal protection problem of our
time, as deeply harmful and frustratingly intractible today as was school
segregation four decades ago. This appeal on its face concerns seemingly
pedestrian issues of discovery and standards of proof. But as the sorry history
of Swain v. Alabama well illustrates, there comes a point at which a concatenation
of technicalities can vitiate the constitutional promise of equal protection of
the law.
The Constitution confers upon federal judges a pivotal role in the process of
eradicating discrimination root and branch both from the practices of government
parties and from their own courtrooms. Implementation of the non-discrimination
principle often turns less on abstract legal doctrine than on the perspicacity
and practical judgment of district judges sensitive to the intricacies of local
practices and realities. In the instant case Judge Marshall has taken only a
modest step, foreswearing any preconceptions about the merits of the
discrimination claim, asking only for a full explanation of the type of pattern
that is deeply troubling to the American people. That action warrants not
reversal but commendation by this Court.
For the above reasons, the decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, MARIA E. STRATTON, Federal Public Defender, BARBARA E.
O'CONNOR, * Deputy Public Defender, Suite 1503, United States Courthouse, 312
North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, (213) 894-2234, Attorneys for
Respondent Shelton Auntwan Martin
* Counsel of Record
TIMOTHY C. LANNEN, 880 W. First St., Suite 516, Los Angeles, CA 90012, (213)
680-3617, Attorney for Respondent Aaron Hampton
DAVID DUDLEY, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800, Los Angeles, CA 90067,
Attorney for Respondent Christopher Lee Armstrong
BERNARD J. ROSEN, 1717 Fourth Street, Third Floor, Santa Monica, CA, (310)
451-4577, Attorney for Respondent Freddie Mack
ERIC SCHNAPPER, University of Washington, School of Law, Of Counsel
APPENDIX A
1. United States v. Washington, CR 91-632-TJH (CDCA), Government's Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Re: Selective Prosecution, Declaration of
David C. Scheper, Chief of Criminal Complaints Section, 9/90 -- 6/92, dated
August 6, 1993 at P5: ". . . federal agents had properly brought the case
to the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the case met our prosecutorial guidelines.
These facts, as well as . . . intelligence that at least one of the defendants
was affiliated with a street gang, led to the decision to prosecute the
defendants."
2. United States v. Washington, CR 91-632-TJH (CDCA), Hearing of December 13, 1993
at 18, 1. 16-21. Assistant United States Attorney Steven Clymer: "Is gang
affiliation or gang membership alone an aggravating circumstance under the
guidelines (for prosecution)? [D]id it play a role in the charging decision . .
.? The answer to both these questions despite any ambiguities in earlier
pleadings is no."
3. United States v. Jamar, CR 95-432-WMB (CDCA), Government's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery at 28: "The Task Force [Los Angeles
Metropolitan Task Force on Violent Crime] uses both state and federal criminal
statutes to dismantle violent street gangs and prosecute their members."
4. United States v. Washington, CR 91-632-TJH (CDCA), Hearing of September 27,
1993 at 18, 1. 17-20; 20, 1. 5-8: The Court: I have yet to see any written
criteria. Assistant United States Attorney Julie Werner-Simon: Well, there
aren't [any]. . . . In fact there is a discussion. The complaints section has a
meeting with a supervisor where they set around and they talk about the
criteria, and they establish whether they're sufficient enough to go
forward."
Hearing of October 28, 1993 at 6, 1. 24-25; 7, 1. 1-5: Defense Attorney Paul
Rochmes: "The government filed a document that they called a Clarification
of Correction, which said that even though at the hearing on September 27th
we've been told that there were no written prosecutorial criteria for
cocaine-based cases, there are. . . . But those were not attached."
Hearing of December 13, 1993 at 4, l. 24-25; 5, 1. 1-6: Assistant United States
Attorney Steven Clymer: ". . . as we pointed out to both the parties and
the Court in our written filings of the guidelines and our notice of the under
seal filing, it's our position that the dissemination of our office's written
guidelines will serve no purpose . . . but merely offer a guideline or manual .
. . how to avoid federal prosecution."