The Effects of ‘Social Expectation’ on the Development of Civil Society in Japan

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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a theoretical explanation for the impact of ‘social expectation’ on the growth of civil society in Japan. Why has civil society developed as it has in Japan? Contrary to the image of Japan as a ‘strong and controlling’ nation-state, we find that private citizens—the non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders, scholars on community planning, and younger liberal politicians—set the conditions towards the growth of civil society, responding to global influences during the 1990s. We argue that the successful implementation of ‘social expectation’ played a central role for creating a social flow towards non-profit organizational activities and for the passage of the Non-Profit Organization Law (NPO Law) in Japan. Social expectation is an internalized social norm for individuals and organizations, thus for society as a whole, about what people should do. It operates on two different levels—first on particular elite groups and then on the general public—driving the dramatic growth of associational activities in Japan. It is a general societal climate where people’s imagined reference groups or communities affect their behaviours. ‘Social expectation’ is a future vision leading Japan towards a citizen-based society through dynamic collaborations among activists, NPOs, and media. We suggest in incorporating a ‘social expectation’ perspective in the study Japanese civil society development.

KEY WORDS: Social expectation, law, social capital, voluntary associations, non-profit organizations, Japan

Introduction

A great number of social movement studies have explained civil society from a bottom-up perspective of the relationship between individual civil engagements and political institutions. The behaviour of individuals with certain cultural values influences political institutions and others in society, which leads to social change. Thus, the degree of individual involvement into civic life matters greatly to the types of civil society they create (Welzel et al. 2005). Institutionalists and political scientists criticize this theoretical view because
institutional patterns of political structures are linked with distinctive patterns of civic involvements on both individual and associational levels (Boyle, 2000; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Associational involvements do not just ‘pop up’ from existing individuals and organizations. Rather, cultural and ideological aspects of institutions shape the types of civic engagements, thus, civil society characteristics.

From Strong State Control to Civil Society

Emergence of Civil Society in Japan

Among political scientists of Japan, the state-centred perspective is predominant in explaining the development of civil society in recent decades. They view that the Japanese state plays the essential role of promoting and directing Japanese civil society (Pharr and Schwartz, 2003; Pekkanen, 2003). But was it the state that initiated the emergence of civil society in Japan? Sociologically, this state-centred perspective is problematic because virtually all the post-industrial nations in the world today have some sort of policies, which encourage certain voluntary associational activities. Even the United States, with a weak state role in terms of civil society growth, has a federal tax policy, which provides benefits to non-profit organizations (NPO) (see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) 2004). Many officially registered donations also provide tax benefits to individuals, thus, encouraging citizen based decision-making and consequently promoting activities by NOPs. Are these not examples of a state promoting civil society? Indeed, the state does have a role in implementing policies and structuring organizations according to such laws. Similarly, citizens do shape civil society in part due to such policies whether it is in a weak state, such as the United States, or a strong state, such as Japan.

Social Expectation

To provide a complete picture of the civil society in Japan, we draw on a conceptualization of Anderson’s (1983, 1991) Imagined Communities—the formation of different types of nationalism, or ‘imagined communities’. More specifically, expanding on his work, we utilize a new concept, ‘social expectation,’ to explain the development of Japanese civil society after the 1980s. We define ‘social expectation’ as an internalized social norm for individuals and organizations, thus for society as a whole, about what people should do.

Social expectation is the general mood of a society about what people should do: the spirit of the times (zeitgeist in German), or in Japanese, related to the kuuki (atmosphere, e.g., Yamamoto, 1977), ikioi (impetus, e.g., Maruyama, 1972), or nagare (current stream). The concept of ‘social expectation’ also relates to Bourdieu’s (1979, 1980) concept of the habitus—the general normative expectations that a citizen takes for granted as the way to live one’s life. Similarly, Habermas’ (1989) idea of the ‘pubic sphere’ also relates to ‘social expectation’. It is the space—the place or medium—for the formation of public opinion and social agreement through collective discussion. This is where people with public interests gather to discuss the ‘public interest’, to carry out social practices, to realize ‘publicness’ and ‘communality’, and to carry out political education (Hasegawa, 2004). Thus, social expectation is a set of new hopes developed through the practice of
public conversation and joint action (Bellah et al., 1991, p. 269), so that it works as a motivation for socially meaningful activities.

In particular, elite groups might internalize social expectation as being affected by imagined reference groups. It functions as a kind of imagined community leading Japan towards a civil society through the media, education, and other social–individual interactions. This is a highly context-dependent ‘situational ethic’ (Minamoto, 1992); yet, it takes into consideration the effects of global normative diffusion to national and local levels. We use Japan as a case to explain how ‘social expectation’ plays a central role in constructing civil society in an increasingly global world.

Our primary research questions are as follows: 1) Why has civil society, and citizens’ organizational involvements into volunteerism in particular, emerged in contemporary Japan? 2) How has the social expectation developed over time? and 3) How is social expectation linked to particular social activism in supporting citizens’ ‘rights’ in society (via the law, numbers of the NPOs, and/or individual civic activism)? Therefore, we question why and how have social expectation, law, and volunteer participation developed as they have? In contemporary Japan, we have observed a growing social expectation for the stronger role of NPOs. We attempt to explain why the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities (hereafter called the ‘NPO Law’) was needed by Japan’s civil society activists before its enactment. In examining these questions, we hope to contribute to the empirical literature on the development of civil society, social psychological trigger for social changes, and the institutionalization of a support system for non-profit organizations.

Civil Society: Associational Activities

Concept of Civil Society and Associational Activities

The concept of civil society developed in the European philosophical and historical experience. Civil society found its clearest instantiation in the United States, as described by Tocqueville (2004), but it is more than a unique historical product. The concept of civil society has much broader significance for the development of democracy around the world. This significance comes from theoretical implications; thus, civil society has a definite theoretical definition and content that should guide research.

What initiates civil society to emerge? The key quality of civil society that promotes democracy is a certain kind of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Welzel et al., 2005). Civil-society scholars have tried to make sense of it with or without a culture–structure dichotomy, using the concept of social capital (Jacobs, 1961; Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Putnam (1993, 2000) views the social capital created from social associations with reciprocal relations as the strongest, which enables larger social interactions, and thus a community of resources. Others (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973; Lin & Bian, 1991) understand that individuals themselves, rather than associations of individuals, could play the role of ‘resource.’ However, Putnam (2000) argues that civil society could become weaker through the loss of cultural capital in local communities, such as the United States for example. Fischer (1982), Skocpol & Fiorina (1999), and Paxton (1999) present an alternative perspective that since the 1960s, social capital is only changing, rather than dying away (Dekker & can den Broek, 2005).
The world-polity theory provides one promising approach in analysing the conditions of the recent emergence and growth of civil society in Japan. The global diffusion of culture and its structural embodiments in recent world history indicate globalization of cultural and structural features of Western society\(^1\) (Thomas et al., 1987; Meyer et al., 1997). This approach argues that, in any society, relational and organizational patterns operate through more or less widely accepted ‘global scripts’. In that sense, the scripts ‘construct’ a taken-for-granted pattern of thought and behaviour that builds up into a larger institutional reality. At the same time, these patterns are often sanctioned and reinforced by the leaders of the dominant institutions anxious to retain the received social basis of their status and power. These two sides, general cultural scripts and intentional elite sanctions, can also provide distinct entry points for agencies of transformation. In any society, the emergence of civil society, if it happens, occurs through a nuanced and complex process of interaction with dominant institutions and elites. Some multiple-nation focused projects have already discovered structural and cultural conditions that affect the emergence and growth of civil society in the world (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). We believe that our research will advance the study on the emerging process of civil society by delving into one nation-state, Japan.

Civil Society and Japan: The Important Role of ‘Social Expectation’\(^2\)

The case of Japan particularly presents an interesting set of factors that impinge upon the development of civil society. These factors provide a good testing ground for our theoretical postulations to explain the emergence and growth of civil society. Japan has a rich history of associational orientations since its pre-modern era (Yamamoto, 1998). Its prosperous civic legacies gave rise to civic associations that played important roles towards the development of civil society in contemporary Japan (see Nakane, 1970; Pharr & Schwartz, 2003). Civic associational networks are human relations that are a form of social infrastructures. Volunteer associational activities are one of the core and popular aspects sociologists analyse to measure the levels of social civility in citizen-oriented societies.

The late 1980s through the early 1990s was a formative time of social, economic, and political structural transition in Japan\(^3\). Since then, new words such as ‘borantia’ (Japanese coined word for volunteerism)\(^4\) and ‘enu-pi-oh’ (a Japanese word for NPO) received tremendous social attention. For a society with changing gender–family relations and an aging population, the development of volunteerism and NPOs was partially out of necessity to fulfil the role of missing family or state care of elderly and children\(^5\). For the functional needs, civil society and a strong sense of volunteerism could have ‘popped up’—but following its historical path, the emergence of civil society could not have been predicted. A strong Japanese state could have encouraged civil society, especially leading particular types of organizational activities (see Pharr & Schwartz, 2003). On the other hand, Tsujinaka (2003) has a positive view on Japan’s development of civil society as diversifying and maturing under its own ‘pop-up’ dynamics. Yet, no existing empirical studies have revealed how exactly civil society in Japan emerged and developed in its recent history.

Existing theories of the emergence of civil society in Japan are, in essence, based on functional needs, state intervention (Pharr & Schwartz, 2003), or voluntaristic ‘pop-up’ from local communities. In contrast, we propose an alternative view of the process
of emergence that aligns well with the world polity approach. We theorize that recent globalization effects on information flows (e.g., Peter F. Drucker’s book and its translation by A Ueda & M. Tashiro on NPOs in 1991), historical events (e.g., Kobe Earthquake of 1995), and pre-existing Japanese cultural values and experiences have all shaped Japanese social expectation for civil society. This research offers evidence to support the initiatives taken by NGO leaders, scholars, younger liberal politicians, and the media to encourage civil activism in Japan. We show that the formation of ‘social expectation’ towards civil society is key to the 1998 NPO Law passage and civil activism’s stable establishment into Japan after the legal passage. Figure 1 shows our theoretical model.

**Data, Measures, & Methods**

**Data and Measures**

To analyse the emergence and growth of civil society in Japan, we focus on the development of volunteerism and the formation of the NPO Law, which legally legitimizes the status of volunteer organizations in Japan. To analyse this issue from different angles, we use multiple sources: 1) legal records and newspapers, 2) national newspaper counts, 3) general attitudinal survey data, and 4) individual volunteer participation and organizational establishment data. Particularly, the Japanese social change, which encouraged the creation of the 1998 NPO Law, provides a picture of Japan’s transformation process towards a stronger civil society. In order to trace the social change towards the development of the NPO Law historically, we analysed the contents of the National Institute for Research Advancement’s (NIRA) study reports on NPO. The NIRA is a policy

![Figure 1. Theoretical model of ‘social expectation’ development in Japan.](image)
research institute funded by national and regional government agencies, labour and industrial organizations, and other private donations to conduct a variety of studies (NIRA 2007). This institute started conducting the first systematic study of a possible policy design to create more associational activities based on non-profit principles in Japan in the early 1990s. Although literature on the 1998 NPO Law refers to the NIRA reports, to our knowledge no studies have analysed the specific NIRA reports in-depth tracing the history of the NPO Law and the role of leaders.

In order to analyse broader social trends toward, civil activism and civil engagement in general, we counted the number of national newspaper articles on these topics in the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun newspapers between 1987 and 2005. In Japan these two newspapers share the largest subscriptions in number. Yomiuri Shimbun has the largest circulation and can be considered populist but with rather a conservative tone. Asahi Shimbun is a former liberal positioning paper that is only recently transforming towards a more populist stance. Nevertheless, the overall national newspaper counts are helpful to understand the growing Japanese social expectation towards civil society.

**Locating the Growth of Media Coverage**

Figure 2 shows the growing number of national newspaper articles with the words, ‘Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs)’ and ‘Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)’. The number slowly start increasing, beginning in 1987. The numbers continue to grow through the year of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe Earthquake). The second steep growth starts from 1998—the year of the NPO Law passage. Since then, the number of newspaper articles with these terms continues to grow and remain high. In the same way, Figure 3 shows increasing numbers of national newspaper articles including at least one of the words, ‘borantia (volunteerism)’ and/or ‘houshi (service labour),’ since 1985. Borantia is a new word in the Japanese language coined from the English term, ‘volunteer.’ Houshi is a synonym, which has continued to be used, often times but not necessarily, with the negative connotation ‘service labor’. The number of appearances of these words in newspapers gradually starts growing beginning in the late 1980s, with an especially steep incline in 1995, the year of the Kobe Earthquake. These simple newspaper article counts alone indicate at least growing interests in volunteerism and non-profit organizations, thus, citizens’ increasing opportunities to encounter information for activism in Japan over time. By 2004, as much as 90% of 3902 randomly surveyed citizens ages 15 to 79 in Japan had heard of the foreign word, NPO, or its newly translated Japanese phrase, minkan hieiri dantai (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2004). This also indicates growing ‘social expectation’ among the public that could generate civic behavior.

**Tracing the History, Analysing the Legal Texts, and Mapping Civil Society Density**

The previous figures in the previous section show the general development of social expectation towards civil society in Japan. These help us direct our discussion on why and how social expectation for civil society has developed on the two levels, first onto the elite level and then onto the general public. They also show how the expectation is linked to particular activisms in Japan since the late 1980s. By triangulating multiple data, we are checking if and how different timings of national events (e.g., the meetings for and publications of the 1994 and 1996 NIRA reports, the passage of the NPO Law
in 1998, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, changes in the national political climates beginning in 1993, and media coverage) affect the civil society development in Japan.

**Expected Findings**

Based on the extant literature, we expect social expectation to play a central role in the growth of civil society in Japan since 1990, initiated by citizen leaders and disseminated to the public by the national media. Among the public, attitudinal transformation occurs first followed by gradual behavioural change. This behavioural lag is key to the newly growing ‘social expectation’ and the implementation of the NPO Law, which breaks down structural barriers for civil engagement (Coser, 1974; Pekkanen, 2003). The following hypotheses elaborate our basic theoretical accounts.

*Leading Roles of Citizens Groups, Economic Elites, and the Media for the 1998 NPO Law*

The major source of this new ‘social expectation’ diffusing through society emerges from a collaborative process among certain Japanese social elites and opinion-leaders, who have links with both the local and the global elite communities. The media reacted to those leaders, including philanthropists and social contributors from big private
companies, covering more stories on associational activities (e.g., Peter F. Drucker’s translated book, 1991). Therefore, contrary to the state-centred arguments (e.g., Pharr & Schwartz, 2003), the Japanese state or ‘government bureaucratic elites’ neither initiated nor controlled this process. The 1998 NPO Law helped the process of the civil society formation after its passage. We expect that the NPO Law is the first crystallized symbol of the new ‘social expectation’ construct and thus brought broader social changes (Pekkanen, 2000, 2003). It was a big step in diffusing social expectation to the larger society. Thus, we expect that:

(1): In the early 1990s, Japanese civil activists, scholars and social elites, along with the national media, reporting international situations of volunteerism and non-profit organizational activism, initiated the emergence of social expectation, mainly within certain elite groups, advocating the importance of volunteer activities and organization. Consequently, the NPO Law is passed, triggered by the social expectation on the elite level.

Volunteer Participations Lagging New Social Expectation

In Japan, the structural restrictions are so strong (see Pekkanen, 2003) that the actual mobilization of individuals and organizations requires very high levels of social expectation. This explains why social expectation is central for motivating ‘voluntary
work’. Thus, we expect that the formation of social expectation for individuals and organizations to work voluntarily for others is crucial for the development of civil society in Japan.

This new social expectation contradicts both long-existing Japanese social norms and forms of social organization, which have been ‘vertical’—that is, based on status inequality with the senior controlling the junior (see Nakane, 1970). Contrarily, civil society refers to ‘horizontal’ social relationships among citizens that permit frank communication and voluntary organization (Putnam, 2000; Putnam et al., 1993). Among a number of beneficial effects, horizontal relationships enhance the community’s capacity to define and defend its own political interests. Horizontal social relationships are indispensable elements of social capital and thus, civil society (Putnam, 2000, p. 32; Putnam et al. 1993). For instance, to Putnam et al. (1993), the reason democracy is weak in Southern Italy is because its community organizations are dominated from above by the Mafia. Similar to Southern Italy, a vertical structure also exists in traditional Japanese social relations (Yamagishi, 2004; Yamagishi, Kikuchi & Kosugi, 1999; Yamagishi & Komiyama, 1995) and organizations (Nakane, 1970). The main dynamic of this transformation of social relations in Japan, is ‘stirred’ by a new social expectation that urges behaviours contradictory to the traditional social forms. Therefore, we expect to find a time lag between the growth of new social expectation and activism. Thus, we expect,

(2): Japanese participation in associational volunteer activism grew after the social expectation for volunteerism among the public had been established. In other words, among the Japanese public, actual volunteer participation lags behind the social expectation set off by the NGOs and other leaders.

It is important to note that we intend to articulate two levels of social expectation: social expectation that was internalized and nurtured by the NGOs and other leaders, on one level, and social expectation on the public level.

Growing Diversity within Social Relations

The process of adopting new social relational norms and practices is not evenly adopted among the population, given the tension between the social norms advocated by the new social expectation (horizontally oriented) and the reality of most organizations and individuals (vertically organized). Younger people and women are more likely to be receptive to horizontal social relations and groups formed on that basis. Whereas, men—particularly the older they are—adhere more towards traditional vertical norms, such as the Japanese work organizational culture of the ‘rapid economic development’ of the 1960s. Accordingly, we expect to find that young people and women tend to reject the vertical society model and are more engaged in horizontal civil society type activities by forming new organizations. Consequently, we expect:

(3): Diversification of social attitudes and relations has accelerated. The youth and women tend to be more receptive to this kind of macro level social change; consequently they have more supportive attitudes and behaviors for volunteerism in Japan since the 1990s.
In sum, we expect that a new social expectation, initiated by the internationally linked NGOs and other leaders, plays an essential role in transforming Japanese social attitudes towards the direction for civil society. Such a social expectation, at both the NGO leaders’ and the public levels, brought the passage of the 1998 NPO Law and accelerated the diversification of social attitudes and relations. Next, we show our analyses of legal, individual, and organizational developments of civil society.

Results: The Important Roles of Civil Activists

Departure from High Social Control – Non-Governmental Leadership

The results offer a support for the successful implementation of ‘social expectation’ as a vision into the social world. ‘Social expectation’ led a dramatic growth of associational activities in Japan. We hope this finding will prove useful to other researchers.

Table A1 shows a timeline of the 1998 NPO Law passage in Japan. The national media began covering the US and European NPOs in the early 1990s. In February and March of 1994, four years before the passage of the NPO Law, two research institutes, the Nissei Basic Research Institute and the National Institute of Research Agency (NIRA), published their research reports on civil society activism and NPOs. The Japanese government held their first research meeting on the issue of the NPOs (Kokumin Seikatsu Shingi Kai) a few months after the publication of the research report. In sum, the national media started introducing international information and private research institutes, including business elites and civil activists, and initiated research for exploring the possible expansion of civil activism and the possible implementation of the NPO related policies. Therefore, contrary to the strong state theory, it was civil activists, as covered by the national media—mainly NGO leaders, scholars, and a small number of business elites—who took initiative towards the NPO policy to promote civil activism.

Table A2 shows the purpose statements of the 1998 NPO Law and the NIRA’s 1996 NPO policy draft. The first section of the 1998 NPO legal text reveals that expectations towards particular directions of social changes are specific and clear. For example, this legal statement clearly presents what is ‘expected’ to happen due to future legal change (Table A2). Interestingly, this expectation changed after the legal implementation was established in 1996 by NIRA’s research on civic activities for public goods (the early reports came in 1994, the second official draft published in 1996). This study report by the NIRA became a basis for the NPO Law passed and enacted in 1998. Overall, the initial legal draft and the actual law for NPOs clearly include the statement of the new ‘social expectation.’ The 1994 report targets NGOs and other leaders, while the 1996 one mainly targets politicians.

Among similar proposals designed by NGOs in Japan during the 1990s, the NIRA’s research reports demonstrate the highest quality research and propose the most realistic design of the NPO Law. Yet, the key actors listed in the NIRA reports (1994, 1996) are NGO leaders who symbolize the citizen-lead emergence of civil society in Japan. Particularly intriguing is the key player for both of the reports, Yoshinori Yamaoka, a former programme officer of the Toyota Foundation—the largest foundation in Japan. He has been the biggest name in the Japanese NGO sector. Yamaoka initiated the NIRA research on NPOs with Katsuaki Kihara and Shouji Sano, both are leaders of community research and development organizations in the summer of 1992. Later, he states that he was an
influential advocate for the passage of the 1998 NPO Law (Yamaoka, 2004). A year after the completion of the second NIRA report in November 1996, he established the Japan NPO Centre. According to a recent interview (C’s, 2002), Yamaoka has supported citizen activism since his tenure at the Toyota foundation. He states in the interview,

What I hope the most is the abolition of the “government permission system (shukanchohyokasei)” for organized civil activities. The starting point for my work is when I wanted to change the situation where most private activities were stuck in the rigid frame of the government permission system. The NPO Law reformed part of the rigid system. However, under the public service corporation system (kouekihoujinseido) the capital has not been used effectively yet. How to make the effective use of such a great amount of capital, rather than to waste out of them, is important for the future of NPO sector in Japan, I believe (translation by the authors; C’s, 2002)

NPO Definitions in the United States and Japan

Table A3 compares the definitions of NPOs in the US federal guideline for tax exemption (26 U.S.C. § 501(c), 2004) and the Japanese NPO Law (1998). The US law stresses economic advantages for a variety of NPOs. Particularly, religious groups are a major part of NPOs in the United States.

In contrast to the US definition, the Japanese NPO Law additionally includes that the purpose of such an organization be to contribute ‘to advancement of the interests of many and unspecified persons’ (Japan Section 1 of Table A3). The Japanese NPO Law also defines NPOs more rigidly than the US guideline. In addition to their 17 specific categories of not-for-profit organizational activities (not shown in the table), the Japanese law restricts the number of paid workers in an organization to less than a third of its members. The Japanese NPO Law initially had no tax exemption provision, the element of tax exemption came a few years later with rigid rules and restrictions. We hope that our comparison of the US and Japanese legal definitions of NPOs provides the reader with some insightful points to consider.

In sum, in the case of the 1998 NPO Law passage, we have highlighted the important roles of certain groups. The Japanese state reacted to growing social expectation; however, it appears that it initially intended to prevent rapid growth of legally legitimated NPOs by not stating a tax benefits provision. Nevertheless, our data here supports our first expected finding that civil activists and social elites contributed to the development of social expectation.

New Social Expectation as a Key Factor—Change Lagged Behind Social Expectation

Previously, Figures 2 and 3 show increasing numbers of national newspaper articles with the words, Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs and NGOs) and volunteerism (borantia, houshi), since the late 1980s. Figure 4 shows logarithmic scales of NPO/NGO newspaper articles that we projected in Figure 2. This technique transforms the simple count of articles (Figure 2) to show the changing (increase or decrease) degrees of the articles each year so that we can visualize the changes over time. Both Asahi and Yomiuri
articles show very similar trends in terms of changes in raw article counts. Figure 2 may be skewed by two newspaper publishers’ differences in the total numbers of articles each year and possibly some influential events. We, therefore, applied a logarithmic transformation to these counts to reflect the level and rate of change in social expectation or attention to NPOs. We see three distinct periods of the newspaper coverage of NPOs: 1) a rapid development period between 1987 and 1994, 2) a constant growth period between 1995 and 1999, and 3) a high and stable period after 2000.

Figure 5 shows the number of individual volunteers and volunteer organizations$^{13}$ since 1985 (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003). The total number of individual volunteers in Japan increased gradually in the early 1990s and expanded on a larger scale beginning in 1995. In 1991, there were 48,787 organizations and 102,862 individuals not formally belonging to volunteer organizations. By 2000, the numbers grew to 362,569 individuals and 95,741 organizations (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003). The consistent growth continues today (see Figure 6). Slightly more than 10% of Japanese citizens have previous volunteer experiences. Among the rest, 50% are wishing or ‘expecting’ to participate in volunteer activities (Figure 3-1 in Cabinet Office of Japan, 2004). This rate has increased to ~60% of Japanese wishing to participate in volunteer work in 2002 (Figure 1-2-4, p.18 Data: Cabinet Office of Japan 2002, published in JMA Research Institute Inc. 2003). Therefore, our data support our second expected finding that a growth in social expectation for civil activisms precedes the development of individual attitudes and behaviours towards civil society. Figure 6 shows strong evidence for the growing number of certified NPOs, which tripled between 2003 and 2007.

Our data partially supports our third expected finding about Japan’s acceleration of diversification of values, particularly led by the youth and women. First, the ‘baby boomer’ generations, rather than the youth, are the ones who expect and actually participate in volunteerism more so than all other age groups in Japan. Although Tsujinaka (2003) shows Japanese women to be more heavily involved in volunteer work than their male counterparts, government on attitudes do not show much gender difference. Government data on attitudes towards volunteer work (Research on People’s Choice and Preference in Life – People’s Attitudes and Needs, cited in JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003) show that older people are more interested in volunteer work. While some data show that women do participate more in volunteer activities than men, others show very little gender difference (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003). Regional differences, rather than age and gender, appear to count more for differences in volunteerism. Figure 7 shows that more urban and liberal prefectures in Japan have higher densities of NPOs. This could be due to cultural and structural restrictions that make it difficult to form voluntary groups due to fear towards collectivism (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, 1997). However, we need more national level data to identify this point. The data suggest that the older generation of baby boomers in Japan leads the growing civil society. While Japanese men are generally more interested in social–political issues (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2002, cited in JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003), their interests do not translate into activism.

Figure 5. Number of volunteers and volunteer organizations in Japan 1985–2003.  
Source: (JMA Research Institute inc. 2003).
Discussion: Reinstalling Civic Engagement into Japanese Life

Not the Strong State Control, but Successful Implementation of ‘Social Expectation’

With the successful implementation of the ‘social expectation’, Japanese society has began transitioning itself from the government’s ‘high social control’ to non-governmental leadership society in a fairly short period of only 20 years. Our findings show how civil society in Japan emerged and developed contrary to the ‘strong state’ assumption (see Pharr & Schwartz, 2003; Peckkanen, 2003). We discovered that civil activists, scholars, and business elites initiated social expectation, through the practice of public conversation and joint action (Bellah et al., 1991, p. 269) in the early 1990s, which was reflected in the NIRA’s legal proposal (1994) and its following research report (1996). Political reactions such as the 1998 NPO Law followed these movements. Our contribution to the study of civil society in Japan is that we outlined the critical role of NGO leaders in the development of social expectation towards civil society. In this section, we discuss our results addressing the question of why social expectation, law, and volunteer participation have developed as they have in Japan.

The embedded social expectation within the minds of activist leaders, scholars, and business elites introduced civil society to Japan. The subsequent media coverages were important to foster citizens’ awareness for activism (social expectation on the macro level), rather than suggested by the pop-up theory (Tsujinaka, 2003), state-centred approach (Pharr & Schwarts, 2003), or functional explanation. There was a need for the

Figure 6. Numbers of applied & certified organizations 1998–2006.
Note: The authors added the most recent numbers to Figure 13-1 in Hasegawa (2004) from the numbers of applied and certified NPOs in Japan.
NPO Law since pre-existing Japanese social structures restricted large scale activism (Coser, 1974; Pekkanen, 2003). The NPO Law has thus structurally enabled individual civic engagement. Prior to the pre-NPO Law, there were limits to organized and larger scale activism (making the pop-up theory implausible). The Japanese state has cooperated with, rather than controlled, the current state of civil society (this provides limited evidence for the state-centred approach). Functional necessity alone provides weak explanation for its growth (partial and incomplete support for the functional explanation). Hence, social expectation played a key role for reinstalling civic engagement into Japan when traditional Japanese style of community volunteerism faded away during rapid industrialization.

It is important to note that Japan passed the NPO Law in 1998, the first law ever, in its 53 years of post-war history, which was prepared by non-governmental leaders. During this process, the bill (a ‘trigger’ to advance civil society in Japan) was prepared by a collaboration of NGO leaders, scholars, specialists of community planning, and economic specialists managing philanthropies who joined the NIRA project (1994, 1996). It was not customary that national parliament members across parties supported a bill by forming a political coalition of the government party (the Liberal Democratic Party) and former opposition parties (the Japan Socialist Party and New Party Sakigake). Previously, government bureaucrats customarily prepared such a bill. However, it was not them, but non-governmental leaders like Yoshinori Yamaska (2004), who successfully
implemented ‘social expectation’ for organizational activisms and brought the NPO Law into Japanese society. This is exactly the point of this paper, but is often overlooked in previous studies. Therefore, the emergence of Japanese civil society during the 1990s was ‘contrary to the image of a strong Japanese state’.

The NPO Law: Unlocking the Field of Associational Civil Activism

Our findings suggest some intriguing points of the Japanese NPO Law and its political backgrounds. Contrary to the US case (see Table A3; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c), 2004), the 1998 NPO Law in Japan simply grants a ‘legal status’ to particular types of NPOs. To be specific, the law 1) legally certifies organizations as NPOs (houjinka); 2) intends to omit not only mafia (yakuza), but also religious and political groups as Articles 2.2 and 12. 3 (not shown) describe clearly; and finally 3) provides no economic advantages. This indicates how the Japanese law prohibits specific organizational activities and excludes particular types of organizations (see Table A3, NPO Law 1998) in contrast to the US case. This highlights specific political concerns about NPO activities in Japan that we might not be anticipating in the US and Europe. These nuanced points are particularly important to help us consider cultural implications of civil society development. Nevertheless, the proposal of the NPO bill consequently increased social discussions on the possibility of associational volunteerism, which raised social consciousness towards civil society (growth of social expectation at the macro level).

Our findings show how social expectation links social activisms in urban and liberal regions (Figure 7) and among the baby-boomer generation rather than younger generations in Japan. The Japanese employment structure can explain why women are the core members of volunteerism (Tsujinaka, 2003), despite the similarities of attitudes toward activism between men and women (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003). Excessive work hours in Japan simply restrict many workers from volunteering. Retired baby boomers with free time started participating in community activities in recent years. With the decline in full-time employment rates and the breakdown of the lifetime employment system of the 1990s, many current and future workers who could have led the civil society movement, were placed into vulnerable work situations with little time to invest in community life. Additionally, due to the gendered employment structure, many women are excluded from the Japanese life-long employment system; the vast majority of women in Japan leave their jobs after marriage and/or childbirth (see, e.g., Brinton, 1993; Strober and Chan, 1999; Inoue and Ehara, 1999, 2005; Chang, 2000, 2004; Hisatake, et al., 2000; Gottfried 2000). The rigid employment structure, which restricts women from returning to good employment positions as a result, allocates these women to work part-time. This, consequently, allows more women to participate in volunteer work, reflecting to the larger number of women in activism in Japan (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003). We also believe that Japanese women’s peripheral status and exclusion from the Japanese employment system ironically encourages them to be involved in new community activities much more than their male counterparts. This is contrary to the fact that many Japanese men are constrained with their employment responsibilities and unable to participate much in volunteer work.

To sum, social expectation played a central role for the development of civil activism in contemporary Japan. At least on the legal level, Japan began reshaping these structural barriers for shortened work hours/days and gender equality. With the concept of
‘social expectation,’ we explain how non-governmental leaders as well as the increasing discussions about volunteerism and the NPO Law, affect Japanese social understanding of particular issues, in this case ‘associational volunteerism’.

**Conclusion**

Our research finds support for the idea that particular elite groups, along with individual and organizational activism, rather than state political control (as often assumed in Japan), contributed to the successful formation of ‘social expectation’, first on the leaders’ level and then among the public. Social expectation is an internalized social norm for society, which guides individuals and organizations to what they should do (see, habitus, *e.g.*, Bourdieu 1979, 1980). This ‘two-step’ process of social expectation formation, consequently, helped civil society to further develop in Japan. Emergence of ‘social expectation’ on the social leaders’ level was a trigger for organizational activism and the development of the current state of civil society in Japan. Earlier civil activism and the importation work of ‘civil society’ by a group of particular leaders, covered by the Japanese national media, successfully diffused this social expectation into Japanese society (*e.g.*, Peter Dracker’s translated book, 1991), an example of the impact of social capital (Jacobs, 1961; Bourdieu, 1983; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Welzel, *et al*., 2005; Dekker & can den Broek, 2005). This is contrary to the frequently made theoretical assumption that Japan’s strong state controls social change. We found that the growth of ‘social expectation’—a future vision of citizens in Japan to participate in individual and organizational activism—started to developed in the late 1980s through the early 1990s before the growth of actual individual and organizational behaviours. Particular NGO leaders, activists, scholars, economic specialists in philanthropy, and liberal politicians were influential to raise social leaders’ consciousness about this ‘social expectation’. The result was the 1998 NPO Law, an extraordinary piece of legislation, designed and supported by the politicians across political parties. Following the passage of the law, the number of volunteer organizations grew dramatically (Figure 6), a tangible actualization of social expectation on a macro level.

Japan’s rich associational cultural history prior to the time we studied (see Nakane, 1970; Yamamoto, 1998; Pharr and Schwartz, 2003) contributed to the construction of this new culture based on ‘social expectation’, to further activate civil society. Rather than the political and legal structures of Japan alone in shaping the current state of civil society, we argue that Japanese style civil activism (culture) initiated and formed political and legal forces (structure) to further advance civil society development (see, *e.g.*, Boyle, 2000; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Such a culture—structure interaction reinforced the mental construct of ‘social expectation’. We expect that the future state of Japanese civil society will develop even further because of the successful development of social expectation, which has changed Japanese attitudes and behaviours on one hand and Japanese legal structures on the other. Additionally, changes in Japan’s demographic makeup and education policies have the effect of encouraging people to participate in organized volunteerism. As the baby-boomer generation reaches retirement age, more are getting involved in unpaid socially contributing work that brings them the feeling of satisfaction and builds friendship in their communities. Statistics (JMA Research Institute Inc., 2003) show that older generations, rather than younger generations, are increasingly involved in volunteer work. But a growing number of schools in Japan has
started including volunteer work activities and systems to encourage students to participate in organized volunteering. We expect many of these younger generations will stay active.

This study provided an alternative explanation for the strong state perspective on social changes. Studying such social transformation processes provides us crucial hints in understanding why some societies transition towards civil society successfully and others do not. It is increasingly important to delve into the effects of globalization on local social change. In this study, using Japan as a case, we confirmed that two levels of ‘social expectation’ played a key role for transitioning a strong-state society towards one with an active civil society. We suggest rewriting stories of civil society development with this ‘social expectation’ perspective.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers of JCS, Professor Helmut K. Anheier, Editor, Marcus Lam, and Joy Robinson for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. This paper was presented at the 2006 Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada. This research was supported by the Abe Fellowship Program of the Social Science Research Council and the Graduate Research Partnership Program Fellowship by the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Minnesota.

Note

1. The concept of democracy is no exception. Given the spread of democracy throughout the world, the growth of civil society has garnered great interest for research. The ‘civil society boom’ in the social sciences was arguably sparked by political events beginning in the late 1960s. Particularly noteworthy historical events for the emergence of the concept of civil society were ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968—invasion by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into Czechoslovakia—and ‘East European Revolution’ in 1989; civil society thus became a phrase synonymous with the fight against communism and military dictatorship (Cohen & Arato, 1992). Marxist oriented scholars paid little attention to civil society up to this point.

2. In this paper, we focus only on the process of the 1998 NPO law passage. The evidence (newspaper articles) presented in this paper is just one indicator of the effects of ‘social expectation.’ We need more data and research to support the idea of a limited state role and the impact of ‘social expectation’ on the development of civil society. Our tentative results from a related project examining the history of modern Japan (the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and Post-war Reforms from 1945) with the ‘social expectation’ concept suggests a very similar process to what we find in this paper. Social expectation—first working as a trigger for social change among leaders and eventually affecting the broader public—functions as a major social transformation mechanism in modern Japanese history.

3. The late 1980s through the 1990s was a time of instability in the history of Japanese politics. A series of prime ministers alternated terms for short periods of time, usually less than 12-months. In July 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party, in power since 1955, lost the majority in the Lower House; this created a non-LDP leading coalition cabinet for the first time in 48 years. Consequently, national politics shifted to a more liberal climate over the next couple of years.

4. See Thraenhardt’s work (1992) on the changing concept of volunteerism in Japan before the 1990s.

5. One of the largest growing areas of volunteer participation is social welfare, between 1992 and 1999 (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2000). Similarly, one of the most supported areas of growth in NPO activities, including community services, is social welfare (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2004).

experience enhanced the role of civil society in Japanese society and accelerated the move towards strengthening civil society.

7. For Asahi, we searched with NPO or NGO or (Zenkaku) for titles and texts for each year (Asahi Shimbun Keisaitikki Raito Kensaku). The system does not sort regional or national publications, thus, we manually sorted out regional publications with Excel. For Yomiuri, NGO Zenkaku or hankaku does not matter in their system for titles and texts in National Publications (Zenkokuban).

8. The NIRA research team first reported on the importance of implementing an NPO law in a draft titled, ‘Research Report on the Support System for Citizen’s Public-Interest Activities’ (NIRA 1994). This was the first and most systematic comparative survey on citizen’s activities in Japan, the United States, and the European countries. The NIRA research committee, with nine-members, consisted of two working groups. The team began preparing the draft in January 1993, and published it in January 1994, a year before the Kobe earthquake. Of the seven out of the nine committee members, five were NGO leaders, another was a community-planning scholar, and one was a banker. Most of the members in the first group, focused on current situations of citizens’ activities in Japan, were NGO leaders. The second group researched the theories and support systems of NPOs in the United States and European countries. The members consisted of a NGO leader, an economist, three scholars in other fields, a community planning specialist, and two members of the Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations), a philanthropist and a social contributor from a big private company. The second NIRA report on the NPO law, ‘The Research on the Laws and System for Promoting Citizens’ Public-Interest Activities’ (1996) took close to a year to prepare, from December 1994 to November 1995. This report proposed six types of possible NPO legal drafts, with recommendations for each of the drafts. The research committee consisted of 13 members: seven NGO leaders, who also worked as a legal scholar, a banker, a community planning specialist, and three specialists in philanthropy and social contributions of large private companies or the Keidanren. Eight out of the 13 were also members of the first NIRA reports committee.

9. He is currently a professor at the Faculty of Social Policy and Administration, Hosei University in Japan.

10. Yamaoa’s essay (2004) also revealed that the NIRA and Toyota Foundation, where he left in March 1992, were located in the same Shinjuku Mitsui Building, when he began his research for the NPO law with Kihara and Sano. Therefore they paid, multiple visits to NIRA and exchanged opinions with the NIRA staff.

11. Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (1998) and Gronjberg (1993) provide useful studies on the non-profit sector in the United States. Hansenfeld and Gidron (2005) add the study of newly emerging hybrid organizations and offer an expanded theoretical framework with a comprehensive and dynamic view of civil society (Also see further elaborations on this point in Galaskiewicz, 2005).

12. The 17 categories of specified NPO activities were only 12 in the original 1998 law. It was later revised and expanded to 17 in 2003.

13. The number of volunteer organizations in the figure is not necessarily legally categorized as NPOs. The total number of organizations with a legal NPO status is fewer (Figure 6).


References


Table A1. History of the NPO law & related events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>NPO related events in the media, political and scholarly activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>‘Public Media Center’—communicative exchange with the U.S. NPO (Yomiuri Shimbun 16 April 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>US, European NPO study, and opinion exchange (Mainichi Shimbun 13 April 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>Nissei Basic Research Institute published ‘Research on Actual Support Toward Civil Activism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>Lecture ‘Mouhitotsuno Nihon Kaizouron’ (Mainichi Shimbun 8 April 1994; Satsuma Shimbun 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>NPO Policy Proposal by the Council for People’s Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Shingi Kai)—the first government involvement about the NPO policy (Mainichi Shimbun 2 July 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1995</td>
<td>Kobe Earthquake (The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquakes) About 6,000 residents died and over 26,000 injured due to the earthquake. Newspapers criticized the Japanese government’s slow reactions, pointed out the important roles of citizens, non-profit and non-governmental organizations. (Yomiuri Shimbun 19 &amp; 20 January 1995; Asahi Shimbun 23 January 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>NIRA’ NPO Policy Suggestion Draft (NIRA 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>NPO Law, passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>NPO Law, implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Japanese state began participating in the NPO policy design about four years after the initial public discussion on the possibility of a law for NPOs. This emergence of civil society in Japan coincides with the diminishing power of the LDP in 1993.

Table A2. ‘Social expectation’ in the Japanese NPO law & NIRA report

1998 NPO Law (Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities)

Chapter I. General Provisions

(Purpose)

Article 1. The purpose of this law is to promote the sound development of specified nonprofit activities in the form of volunteer and other activities freely performed by citizens to benefit society, through such measures as the provision of corporate status to organizations that undertake specified nonprofit activities, and thereby to contribute to advancement of the public welfare.

_NPO Law:_ This is a widely accepted unofficial translation by the Japan Center for International Exchange (Retrieved on 26 April 2007 from http://www.jcie.or.jp/civilnet/monitor/npo_law.html)


Executive Summary

The advancement of citizens’ public-interest activities is indispensable for the creation of a self-actualizing society and the rebuilding of local communities. The organizational core of such activities is made up of citizens’ groups, which contribute to small government and promote responsibility within society. These groups also play a main role in the area of the economy and as engines for encouraging awareness of global citizenship.

Most citizens’ organizations in Japan, however, are voluntary groups, and do not possess incorporated status. In many ways this lack places constraints on the development of their activities. The constraints pose the most serious problems for organization whose scale of activities has grown to the extent that they have established office headquarters. Only organizations that are incorporated are recognized by society as responsible entities, seen as autonomous and independent bodies capable of forming contracts with other organizations, and in a position to cooperate with international endeavors.

Under the current system, the only way for citizens’ groups to incorporate themselves is to seek the status of public-interest corporation as an incorporated foundation (zaidan hojin), incorporated association (shadan hojin), or other organization authorized under he provisions of the Civil Code. However, by the nature of the Civil Code itself, according to which administrative responsibilities are divided along vertical jurisdictional lines, the competent authority may differ depending upon the area in which an organization’s activities fall. Because of this system, incorporated organizations find it extremely difficult to engage in activities that cross jurisdictional lines. Strong government involvement in the establishment of a corporation and close subsequent supervision by the authorities also discourage such corporations from becoming truly autonomous and responsible. Since purpose for the public benefit is a major requirement, furthermore, simply being a nonprofit organization alone is not enough to obtain incorporation. The conditions for incorporation are also very strict because incorporation is directly linked to certain tax privileges. These circumstances strongly militate against incorporation of citizens’ groups. Today, it is urgent that various citizens’ groups be incorporated in order to encourage vigorous activities for public-interest endeavor. This requires a new, nonprofit corporation system that assumes that:

1) Ways can be found to avoid rigid jurisdictional divisions among government agencies and thereby make possible a wider range of nonprofit activities; 2) A normative system can be adopted in which establishment of nonprofit corporations is achieved with a minimum of administrative involvement; 3) The nonprofit nature of an organization can be guaranteed by disclosure of information to citizens rather than by close supervision by competent authorities; and 4) In terms of taxation, the corporation will be treated the same as what are presently knows as ‘voluntary groups’ (nin’i dantai), and that tax breaks for donations and other incentives be determined

(Table continued)
according to how much the corporation contributes to society and the degree of its disclosure of information.

Three drafts for drastic revision of the Civil Code and another three drafts of a special law have been formulated and examined as legal action for the realization of a new corporation system, and of there, we present in this report two drafts of the revised Civil Code and two outline drafts of a special law, with commentaries added concerning their main points.

The above constitutes Part One of the report. Part Two consists of committee members’ views and arguments concerning the significance of the establishment of such a corporation system for Japanese society not only in terms of the economy and business but also from the viewpoints of the promotion of private nonprofit culture and the feasibility of an even better system.

NIRA Research Report, No. 960075, p. 3–4. This is an official translation by the NIRA.

Note: The authors underlined the phrases and sentences, which indicate ‘social expectation’ in the statements.

Table A3. Comparisons of the US and Japanese legal definitions of NPOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exemption Requirements</td>
<td>1998 NPO Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC Section 50 (c)(3)</td>
<td>Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. General Provisions (Definitions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. “Specified nonprofit activities” under this law shall mean those activities specified in the attached schedule, which are for the purpose of contributing to advancement of the interests of many and unspecified persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “Specified nonprofit corporation” under this law shall mean an organization that has as its main purpose the implementation of specified nonprofit activities, that conforms with each of the following items, and that is a corporation established under the provisions of this law:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. an organization that is covered by both of the following items and is not for the purpose of generating profits:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. provisions regarding acquisition and loss of qualifications for membership are not unreasonable;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. the number of officers receiving remuneration total no more than one-third of the total number of officers;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. an organization whose activities conform with each of the following items:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. the activities are not for the purpose of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued)
Table A3. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• must ensure that its earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual</td>
<td>propagating religious teachings, performing ceremonies, or educating or fostering believers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• must not operate for the benefit of private interests such as those of its founder, the founder’s family, its shareholders or persons controlled by such interests</td>
<td>b. the activities are not for the purpose of promoting, supporting, or opposing a political principle;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• must not operate for the primary purpose of conducting a trade or business that is not related to its exempt purpose, such as a school’s operation of a factory</td>
<td>c. the activities are not for the purpose of recommending, supporting, or opposing a candidate (including a prospective candidate) for a public office (meaning a public office as specified in Article 3 of the Public Offices Election Law [Law No. 100 of 1950]; the same shall apply hereafter), a person holding a public office, or a political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• may not have purposes or activities that are illegal or violate fundamental public policy</td>
<td>Exempt Purpose—To be tax exempt, an organization must have one or more exempt purposes, stated in its organizing document.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC lists the following exempt purposes: charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary, fostering national or international sports competition, preventing cruelty to children or animals, and testing for public safety.


NPO Law: This is a widely accepted unofficial translation by the Japan Center for International Exchange (Retrieved on April 26, 2007 from http://www.jcie.or.jp/civilnet/monitor/npo_law.html)

Note: The authors underlined the phrases and sentences which define about NPO definitions in the statements.