The Cities of the Global South Reader adopts a fresh and critical approach to the field of urbanization in the developing world. The Reader incorporates both early and emerging debates about the diverse trajectories of urbanization processes in the context of the restructured global alignments in the last three decades. Emphasizing the historical legacies of colonialism, the Reader recognizes the entanglement of conditions and concepts often understood in binary relations: first/third worlds, wealth/poverty, development/underdevelopment, and inclusion/exclusion. By asking: “Whose city? Whose development?” the Reader rigorously highlights the fractures along lines of class, race, gender, and other socially and spatially constructed hierarchies in global South cities. The Reader’s thematic structure, where editorial introductions accompany selected texts, examines the issues and concerns that urban dwellers, planners, and policy makers face in the contemporary world. These include the urban economy, housing, basic services, infrastructure, the role of non-state civil society-based actors, planned interventions and contestations, the role of diaspora capital, the looming problem of adapting to climate change, and the increasing spectre of violence in a post-9/11 transnational world.

The Cities of the Global South Reader pulls together a diverse set of readings from scholars across the world, some of which have been written specially for the volume, to provide an essential resource for a broad interdisciplinary readership at undergraduate and postgraduate levels in urban geography, urban sociology, and urban planning as well as disciplines related to international and development studies. Editorial commentaries that introduce the central issues for each theme summarize the state of the field and outline an associated bibliography. They will be of particular value for lecturers, students, and researchers, making the Cities of the Global South Reader a key text for those interested in understanding contemporary urbanization processes.

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"Development and the City"


Michael Goldman

I have understood the population explosion intellectually for a long time. I came to understand it emotionally one striking hot night in Delhi a few years ago. The streets seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and screaming... As we moved slowly through the mobs, hands hauling, squattings, the dust, noise, heat and cooking fires gave the scene a hellish aspect. Would we ever get to our hotel? All three of us were, frankly, frightened... since that night I’ve known the feel of over-population. (Ehrlich 1968)

REVILED AND DESIRED: SCHIZOPHRENIA OVER THE THIRD WORLD CITY

In the once-rocky fields southwest of Delhi sits triumphantly the Indian metropolis Gurgaon, built by a real estate mogul and now a magnet for Fortune Global 500 firms. Along with the fastest-growing cities of the North are suffering from some cities of the North are suffering from some cities of the North are suffering from some cities of the North are suffering from... resource global-city-planners’ lament is the lack of capital investment, inadequate to keep up with the torrent pace of urban expansion in the global South.

As one British fund manager explained to me at an investors meeting in New Delhi in 2010, it is not a question of a world divided between “developed” (i.e., the North) and “emerging” (i.e., the Global South), markets, in which the latter is too risky for investors. US and European cities are now seen by Wall Street as “declining” and global South cities are the new “growth” markets overflowing with opportunities for high returns. “Who is still willing to invest in the dying markets of the North?” he asked with a hint of irony.

Large pension funds from California, Texas, and Ottawa, and sovereign wealth funds from Abu Dhabi and China have plenty of capital and are eager to invest in urban projects in many developing countries. People eating, people washing, people sleeping... Since that night I’ve known the feel of over-population. (Ehrlich 1968)

DEVELOPMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON CITY MAKING

The twentieth century was full of nationalist hope and ambition. In the post-World War II era, declarations of fulfilling “basic needs” of providing food, health, and security to the majority, by developing with a strong state and an economy geared toward production for the nation became the goal. These goals included the desire to nationalize resources and industries controlled by imperial powers abroad. As countries fought for national independence, the political question for nationalist movements was how to keep national wealth circulating within the country and avoid social classes so that the uneven and exploitative circuits of the colonial past could be broken and new social relations around production could be created, nationally and globally.

Some Southern countries experimented with a political-economic regime called “import substitution industrialization” (ISI) between the 1930s and 1970s, which countered the demands of Europe and the US for raw materials-producing countries to make these resources cheaply available. With the world-wide depression of the 1930s, the new strategy—among newly independent nations as well as many Latin American countries—was to protect national industries and populations from the extreme volatilities and uncertainties that triggered crisis for the global economy. Bryan Roberts explains how ISI worked in Latin America because of the relative weakness of local capital, the Latin American state became an active agent in urban development (Roberts 1996). State employment was high and concentrated in cities; cities became “places of refuge” for a rural and small town population “for whom the agrarian structure no longer provides sufficient income for household subsistence” (Roberts 1999: 674). Government-led industrialization created internal demand for locally produced goods, created jobs, set rent controls for affordable housing (government built), offered food subsidies, and supported relatively strong trade unions-backed rights.

Across the globe in Bandung, Indonesia, 29 independence leaders representing more than 1.5 billion people met in a conference hall in April 1955 to discuss African and Asian solidarity opposition to colonialism and the virulently cold war politics of the US and Soviet Union, as well as search for ways to
engage each other culturally and economically (now known as the "Bandung conference"). Subsequently, progressive African leaders, including Nyerere of Tanzania, Senghor of Senegal, Nkrumah of Ghana, and Touré of Guinea initiated a policy of "African socialism" (a traditional form distinct from Europe's). In this view, the economy was a public good, and economic development was guided by a large, job-creating public sector. In 1967, Nyerere released the Arusha Declaration that promoted an African model of development based on what he called Ujamaa, a Swahili word meaning "extended family"—a moral compass for a national plan based on the notion of shared development.

All of these development models stood in stark contrast to those coming from European and US governments and from those Northern institutions they led, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These twin agencies were created at a meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944, as World War II was winding down and the global economy was in collapse. In response, US and British economic advisors John Maynard Keynes and Henry Morgenthau called together allied world leaders to figure out how to re-build the global economy, secure devastated currencies, and get production back on track.

The most influential development organization to emerge was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the World Bank (McMichael 2009; Goldman 2005). Over time, the bank's Board of Directors and upper management comprised officials selected mainly from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, US, Canada, and Japan. Most of its earliest projects went to build up the infrastructure that fed the global economy: rebuilding the mines, power plants, factories, and ports that would export raw materials, and extract minerals from the mines for the industrial factories in the global North. The IMF's job was to harmonize national currencies and encourage roles to stabilize wild fluctuations in currency values and activities, and promote the unimpeded movements of capital and goods, so as to end what Morgenthau called "economic nationalism" (McMichael 2009).

From the 1950s through the 1970s, development policy makers and project lenders thus found their mission outside the cities, in the rural-based sectors of energy, agriculture, industry, and transport. From an urban perspective, rural-based development could stop the flow of the rural poor migrating into the city in search of remunerative work; and, from the perspective of Robert McNamara, World Bank president from 1968 through 1981, such capital investments could also help bring about social revolutions in the countryside of ex-colonies such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cambodia.

While the World Bank President justified these rural investments to his staff and clients as contributing to overall economic growth, and perhaps reducing the stress of in-migration on cities, he had a difficult time selling the idea of lending directly to large cities. Since the bank was dominated by neoclassical economists with a Wall Street business sense (all of its presidents have been Americans, and most came from Wall Street), the prudish question became: on what grounds could it justly lend money to cities? The World Bank needed to find the urban equivalent of the rural peasant, "a tolerable population that could be the recipient of or direct beneficiary of productive investments, not simply welfare transfers," as political scientist Edward Ramsamy put it (Ramsamy 2008: 83). In the mid-1970s when World Bank President McNamara introduced an urban department into the institution's growing bureaucracy, he was met with extreme wariness. The whole idea of lending for "the urban" sounded unfamiliar to most World Bank economists, quite different from lending for energy, farming, or transport. "Some people in the Bank were making jokes that next we are going to have suburban development, or an outer-space development program" (Ramsamy 2008: 83).

Under the rubric of "basic needs programming," the World Bank did start to finance very small schemes for "slum upgrading" and helped in the creation of UN-Habitat in 1978, a marginally funded UN agency focused on city development to counter-balance the many urban and rural development. The belief was that if housing and access to water and sewerage facilities were improved, the poor could have their basic needs met and could be better participants in the economy.

Urban development is a complex issue, as Matthew Gandy demonstrates in his work on Lagos. Nigeria (Gandy 2008). Lagos is the largest, most prominent Western African metropolis and a city in which development planners have taken a great interest. In the late 1970s, according to Gandy, an urban development advisor for Nyerere's government during the Vietnam War, Walt Rostow, promoted his book, Stages of Economic Growth, and his beliefs on how countries develop economically with a US-centric understanding of industrial development (Rostow 1960).

Despite its profound shortcomings (e.g., ignoring the structural roles of European-derived colonial and capitalist relations that underdeveloped parts of the global South), it caught the imagination of Northern policy makers and economists. As Modernization has since become the foundational framework for understanding global North-South relations, as well as the justification for the role and logic of development institutions such as the World Bank (McMichael 2009).

Another perspective emerged during the 1970s, from development consultant and scholar Michael Lipton who detected an "urban bias" within development institutions, as well as in national policies, favoring the needs of the urban elite. Lipton detected the large accumulation of wealth in the city as built on the backs of rural areas (Lipton 1977). He argued that resources were often sucked out of the countryside and funneled into the cities, through political pressures to keep crop prices low so that urban food prices would be kept low. This bias toward the city benefited urban workers as well as their employers who could pay them less as a result.

Other debates run through the scholarly literature around the questions of how cities grow, how they generate wealth, and how they allocate resources, public space, and social goods such as open public areas for markets and housing. Many large Southern cities were (and some still are) important manufacturing sites and hence crucial to the national economy. By the 1980s, for example, the Bangalore metro area contributed almost 90 percent of Thailand's gross national product (GNP) in services and 75 percent in manufacturing, while having only 10 percent of the nation's population (Rasul and Crenshaw 1995). Similarly, Lagos produced half of Nigeria's manufacturing value, and Mexico City alone generated 30 percent of Mexico's GNP as Sao Paolo did for Brazil. Yet access to basic public goods such as health care and clean water, and especially a living wage, was not part of the lives of the working majority.

By contrast, and as a strong critique, dependency and world-systems theorists challenged the dominant perspective of modernization, arguing that capitalism is a historically unique and powerful social formation emerging from colonialism that creates unequal structures of exploitation and reproduction (Frank 1966; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Wallerstein 1974; Amin 1976). The beneficiaries are mostly elite classes in the major cities of the North (called "the North") and secondarily in the urban South (or "periphery"). Some called this process "underdevelopment," whereby the wealthier classes and governments in the North underdeveloped governments and populations
in the South (Amin 1976; Frank 1966). Such scholars argued for a historical analysis that revealed the dual processes of urbanization that inextricably linked wealthy and powerful countries as discrete objects with their own internal plans and successes/failures, "developing" sequentially, these critical social theorists understood history in relational terms. That is, England became wealthy and powerful because it exploited India's wealth and possibilities, thereby "underdeveloping" it (McMichael 2010). In their view, as capitalism evolved after colonialism, new hierarchies and social relations emerged, such that cities like Singapore, Shanghai, and more recently Dubai contributed to the reshaping of a multi-polar system of capitalism. In either case, these scholars argued that one should not diagnose and solve developmental problems as if they exist in a vacuum, or are due to purely localized problems of "lacks" or deficiencies.

Michael Castells added an urban dimension to the dependency school approach. Dependency, he argued, was not only an external condition and imposition, but also an internal set of practices, reproducing localized forms of inequality as one can see in the social tensions within Latin American cities where he studied (Castells 1977). Therefore, he contended that one should study the interaction between global and national structures of inequality as interdependent processes. Simply put, local political and economic elites also have agendas that can lead to greater class disparities and social injustices, and the effects can be seen in the rise of the gated enclaves in and around cities in the vast areas of favelas (slums), where the poor, who do so much of the daily work for the city, live. The majority of these workers produce the wealth for the city but the city's public services provide little in terms of safe and adequate housing, drinking water, health care, waste removal, schools, and most importantly, living wages (i.e., enough income to work oneself out of poverty).

URBAN SHOCK THERAPY: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND NEOLIBERALISM

By the 1970s in Chile and Argentina, and almost everywhere else in the 1980s (except, notably, China), the state-centered model of development ended and a new approach, which privileged the private sector and "market mechanisms," was embraced. This development shift paralleled a global political project emphasized by US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s, which critical scholars call neoliberalism. This ideology reflected the belief that market actors, such as corporations, should direct national economies rather than governments (or trade unions), which are supposedly dominated by political interests. In the development industry, this political ideology drew strong support from the World Bank and the IMF both of which pushed the idea that less regulation and more freedom of market actors such as large firms would reduce corruption, politics, and market inefficiencies. Beginning in the 1970s, the World Bank imposed structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on countries of the global South, with the goal of reducing the role of the state. They insisted that their borrowers sell off important national assets such as steel factories, coal mines, railways, and telecommunications companies to local or foreign firms. They also insisted that governments charge "user fees" for public services (e.g., education and health care) that were once provided for free or very cheaply to the poor majority.

This new development approach was based on the belief that firms, especially more "experienced" Northern firms, knew best how to run a business and that cities basically comprised numerous government enterprises that functioned poorly: They believed that converting these once-public services to a private, fee-for-service model would both lead to greater efficiency in their use and convert urban citizens into reliable and responsible customers. One of the sectors in which these ideas were put to the greatest test—and failed—was water (see box). Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF required that governments deviate their currencies, cut tariffs on imports, and re-orient the output of their farms and factories toward those who could pay, namely foreign rather than local customers. Since the Bank and the IMF held the purge strings, cash-starved countries reluctantly followed these controversial prescriptions, despite that they were never promoted in Northern countries in such an extreme fashion.

The net effect was disastrous for the poorest populations. Indicators for national-level health, life expectancy, income equality, and per-capita GDP growth, all fell dramatically during the neoliberal, structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s (Weisbrod and Ray 2011; Imai 2004). When development experts insisted that countries introduce user fees for children attending elementary schools and for families using local health clinics, attendance dropped precipitously. Morbidity rates increased and life expectancies dropped. Health and education budgets, already low by comparison to the North, reached their lowest point since the colonial era (Imai 2004). Development scholars have consistently summarized the effects on the African continent as follows: as a result of structural adjustment policies, "Africa spends four times more on debt interest payments than on health care. This combined with cutbacks in social expenditure caused health care spending in the 42 poorest African countries to fall by 50% during the 1980s" (Imai 2004:12).

This draconian development policy reversed most of the gains that countries had enjoyed during the post-independence, nation-centered development period. The worst hit countries were the poorest, those that had little choice but to follow World Bank and IMF prescriptions if they did not want to lose access to international capital and loans. Middle-income countries and China were notable exceptions, as they pursued decidedly state-led, non-neoliberal plans.

Neoliberal policies undertaken by many countries in the global South reduced employment in major cities where government offices were located; they also reduced employment protections and important subsidies for public goods and services. By and large, electricity, water, health services, schooling, and waste removal were priced at levels that most consumers could not afford. With rising water and
electricity prices and the loss of subsidies for locally consumed foodgrains. Local diets often became unaffordable. Housing prices were de-subsidized and housing became part of a globally competitive real estate market, which priced many poor city dwellers out of their homes. There is a large literature about the near universal failure of these development policies to improve the poor's lives (Ibarra 2004; Naiman and Walker 1999; SAPRIN 2002; Weisbrod and Ray 2011). Ibarra concludes that "after 15 years of following World Bank and IMF-imposed policies, Latin America, by the late 1990s, was going through its worst period of social and economic deprivation in half a century." By 1997, nearly half of the region's 460 million people had become poor—an increase of 60 million in ten years" (Ibarra 2004: 9).

But cities have also been the site of popular protests against draconian development policies. In the 1980s, city streets broke out in "bread riots" and anti-IMF protests, closing down business and governments (Wolton and Seddon 1994). Some eventually led to small and large changes, including the toppling of conservative political regimes, which often were the most compliant World Bank clients. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Latin American governments were voted out in Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Election campaigns highlighted the desire to kick out the World Bank and IMF and nationalize ownership of natural resources. A new Banco del Sur (Bank of the South) was inaugurated in September 2009 with the objectives of boycotting the major development agencies and pooling capital resources from progressive Latin American governments (starting with $20 billion) to invest in social welfare and development projects. In the midst of these normative shifts in Latin America, a socially progressive set of priorities that pushed against the grain of capitalist development ideology and practices.

SPECULATING ON GLOBAL CITIES

In 2009, World Bank President Zoellick announced:

Infrastructure is a cornerstone of the World Bank Group's recovery strategy for the global economic crisis. These investments can create jobs today and higher productivity and growth tomorrow... the needs are huge: an estimated 880 million people still live without safe water; 1.5 billion people without electricity; 2.5 billion without sanitation; and more than one billion without access to an all-weather road or telephone service. The world's urban population is expected to increase from 3.3 billion to five billion by 2030—with Africa and Asia doubling their urban populations—creating new infrastructure demands for transport, housing, water waste collection, and other amenities of modern life.

These infrastructure choices will shape cities and lifestyles for many decades or even a century to come. (Zoellick 2009)

Thus began the current era in which the global South city itself becomes the marketable commodity under the guidance of global development (De Soto 2000; World Bank 2008; Glaeser 2012).

From the perspective of World Bank official Hernando de Soto, the misery of the South is rooted in the: the ideas that sit right under the poor and their land—including the public spaces they inhabit such as sidewalks, plazas, and slum areas squatted upon by hard-working but low-income populations. The solution to this problem has now become: expand the railway station into a shopping mall, the sidewalks into private property, slums into central business districts, and charge fees for government services outsourced to international firms. Streamline, upgrade, and globalize resources, services, public spaces, and land, and you can ignite the transformation of the wretched mega-city into a global city, a place where international capital and its employees would desire to invest and settle.

The development enterprise did not sit in love with the idea of globalizing cities on its own; indeed, as is true with its earlier shifts in lending policies, it tends to follow and support, trends emerging from what it sees as the vibrant new cities of the twenty-first century. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a tremendous consolidation and unleashing of power from what were once fairly discrete organizations of local and international finance, housing, banking, inventing, real estate. This consolidation has created large pools of finance and real estate capital working across borders and the globe, and have built the megacities around the world. These global cities are often co-sponsored by real estate and capital goods firms. On one end of the spectrum, the World Bank and bilateral agencies advocate for the "urban turn" in lending and urban planning; at the other end, environmental NGOs and experts have deemed cities as the new site of green innovation for carbon-cutting built environments, living spaces, and transport systems. Whereas once these actors deplored the magnificence of the Third World, today, cities are now seen as the fount of innovation and "best practices" for "ending poverty" and for "sustainable lifestyles." By 2012, the World Bank declared that financing city infrastructure was one of its most important endeavors (Reckoning Cities 2012).

The rationale for these global investment practices starts with the assumption that Southern cities have been dying under the weight of mega-city problems, including a culture of nepotism that has made it hard for any national government to become drivers of national economic fortunes; at the same time, they require large swathes of public or farming land, discounted by governments and often with guarantees of $2 per day. In 2013, it sits mostly empty.

Is this the way to build up a city with equitable access to basic services, good employment, and affordable housing and clean water? These speculative, and seemingly failed, urban projects and visions can do harm to more than just their investors. For one, they require large swatches of public or farming land, discounted by governments and often with guarantees of 24/7 water, electricity, and the latest transport systems—resources that nearby communities rarely receive. World Bank loans are oftentimes featured in the lure for investors to come to town, even though the greater population must contribute to the repayment of these loans. Second, this type of speculative urbanism has sparked a new form of urban governance that reduces the quality of public services, such as Singapore, London, Shanghai, and New York (Goldman 2011). Third, and perhaps most importantly, this type of frenetic city building displaces large populations to accommodate investors. In China alone, it is estimated that tens of millions have been displaced in the past decade from city expansion and reconstruction (Fisting 2010).

The latter trend seems to be a grand contradiction from any attempts to build secure and affordable cities for the majority. Urban and rural social movements have risen in protest against what is being called "land grabbing" for these luxury endeavors.

These global-city strategies were conveyed by national and international policy networks, creating a global or "common" space for cities, led by consultants like McKinsey, PricewaterhouseCoopers, UN agencies (e.g., UN-Habitat, the UN Development Program), international finance institutions (e.g., the World Bank), and global forums such as the World Cities Summit and the C40 Cities Mayors Summit. These forums are often co-sponsored by real estate and capital goods firms.

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Today, China is home to thousands of protests, especially in its smaller cities and large towns. Elsewhere, city dwellers are challenging these development processes and working to reclaim and remake their city in their own image, rather than the imagined one of global-city boosters. One prominent Africanist scholar argues it is often the Africans marginalized by failed global-city projects who mobilize “the city as a resource for reaching and operating at the level of the world” (Simone 2009). City dwellers, local governments, and even many actors in the global economy cannot cope with such volatility, as the crippling global financial crisis of 2007–2008 demonstrated.

NEW APPROACHES TO THINKING ABOUT CITY LIFE AND LIVELIHOODS

As Achille Mbembe (2004) and other African scholars note, there is nothing new to the idea that African cities have been re-organized to transform or re-constitute, spatially and imaginatively (see Miraftab 2012). To complement and counterbalance the premise that external forces have often dictated (local) realities, these scholars start from the place where the majority of city dwellers live, where they work and struggle, and create, and then assess the influences of external forces in situ. Abdullahi Simone observes that most African demizers thrive at a distance from the formal center of the city, far from where official practices and structures dominate (Simone 2004a, 2006b). That is, urban life for the majority is not solely defined by the impact of a mega-project or a development policy; rather, the African urban is constituted in large part by the multiple ways that people generate their own markets and social goods, and feel and express their own sentiments and sensations, or what he calls “people as infrastructures.” In a similar vein, Mbembe stresses “ways of seeing” that overcome the myopic outsider’s view only of the market, either macro/micro or neoliberal. They are calling for a more ground-up analysis of how the non-elite majority creatively constitutes the city, and insists on injustices and grievances (Penguin 2016). If we can better understand how urban poverty and wealth are co-constituted and legitimated, through forms of capitalist development, we can better understand the alternatives. This approach reveals that which the developmentalist’s focus on (often, the negative) periphery hides. It suggests that, to the extent possible, one can begin to see global South cities in their complexities and possibilities, not in caricature or in comparison to the North and its standards and misperceptions.

From this vantage point, we can also see the multiple modernities of the urban, to better understand global South peoples as actors making cities and histories, as subjects constituted in times of crises, resisting authorities and creating aspirations and livelihoods (Mbembe and Roitman 2013, Mignolo 2010; Roy 2009a). This is a perspective that does not assume a half-formed subject or a malignant modern, but it also is not a romanticized reading of reality. Instead, it starts from the premise that the same powers of creativity, expertise, and infinite possibilities that have been associated with the cosmopolitan urbanite of the global North be granted their counterpart in the Southern city. In post-apartheid South Africa, one of the most vibrant urban social movements is Abahlali baseMjondolo, shackdwellers pushed to the limits by the police who have had the mandate to aggressively destroy slums, especially in the brutal “clean up” prior to the 2010 FIFA soccer World Cup event. They have no party affiliation; instead they have conjured up their own modes of politics, and built power and resources to their homes and workshops and access to urban public space—the “right to the city” which so many South Africans have lost. Their ambition is to take back the urban commons that have been privatized or made accessible only to elites.

CONCLUSION: CITIES OF INFINITE POSSIBILITY?

As perhaps as momentous as 1871 (insurrection of the Commune of Paris), 1917 (Russian Revolution), 1989 (Eastern European revolutions), the year 2011 erupted into a series of unexpected urban revolts. From Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, to Pearl Square in Manama, Bahrain, a diverse array of political and social movements have banded the streets of major and minor cities and declared that a new world was possible, one free of autocratic rule, free of austerity and exploitation, free of multiple forms of oppression. How shall we theorize the urban nature of these expressions of people’s power and social change, as they unfold over the decades?

No longer should cities such as Tunis and Tripoli be portrayed as provincial outposts far from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest national identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest global identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest global identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest global identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest global identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest global identities, cities that are separate from the raw materials necessary to construct its newest.

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