Case
Was
the Photographic Identification Reliable?
Manson
v. Brathwaite
432
U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)
Nowell Brathwaite was charged with
possession and sale of heroin. The jury found him guilty and the judge
sentenced him to not less than six nor more than nine years. The Supreme Court
of Connecticut affirmed. Fourteen months later, Brathwaite filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut. He alleged that the admission
of the identification testimony at his state trial deprived him of due process
of law to which he was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District
Court dismissed his petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, with instructions to issue the writ unless the
State gave notice of a desire to retry respondent and the new trial occurred
within a reasonable time to be fixed by the District Judge. The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut denied relief, and Brathwaite
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Facts
Jimmy D. Glover, a trained Negro
undercover state police officer was assigned to the Narcotics Division in 1970.
On May 5 of that year, at about 7:45 p. m., e.d.t., and while there was still
daylight, Glover and Henry Alton Brown, an informant, went to an apartment building
at 201 Westland, in Hartford, for the purpose of purchasing narcotics from
"Dickie Boy" Cicero, a known narcotics dealer.
Cicero, it was thought, lived on
the third floor of that apartment building. Glover and Brown entered the
building, observed by back-up Officers D'Onofrio and Gaffey, and proceeded by
stairs to the third floor. Glover knocked at the door of one of the two
apartments served by the stairway. It appears that the door on which Glover
knocked may not have been that of the Cicero apartment. Petitioner [John
Manson, Commissioner of Corrections] concedes that the transaction "was
with some other person than had been intended." The area was illuminated
by natural light from a window in the third floor hallway.
The door was opened 12 to 18 inches
in response to the knock. Glover observed a man standing at the door and,
behind him, a woman. Brown identified himself. Glover then asked for "two
things" of narcotics. The man at the door held out his hand, and Glover
gave him two $10 bills. The door closed. Soon the man returned and handed
Glover two glassine bags.
[Footnote: This was Glover's
testimony. Brown later was called as a witness for the prosecution. He
testified on direct examination that, due to his then use of heroin, he had no
clear recollection of the details of the incident. On cross-examination, as in
an interview with defense counsel the preceding day, he said that it was a
woman who opened the door, received the money, and thereafter produced the
narcotics. On redirect, he acknowledged that he was using heroin daily at the
time, that he had had some that day, and that there was "an inability to
recall and remember events."]
While the door was open, Glover
stood within two feet of the person from whom he made the purchase and observed
his face. Five to seven minutes elapsed from the time the door first opened
until it closed the second time.
Glover and Brown then left the
building. This was about eight minutes after their arrival. Glover drove to
headquarters where he described the seller to D'Onofrio and Gaffey. Glover at
that time did not know the identity of the seller. He described him as being
"a colored man, approximately five feet eleven inches tall, dark
complexion, black hair, short Afro style, and having high cheekbones, and of
heavy build. He was wearing at the time blue pants and a plaid shirt."
D'Onofrio, suspecting from this
description that respondent might be the seller, obtained a photograph of
respondent from the Records Division of the Hartford Police Department. He left
it at Glover's office. D'Onofrio was not acquainted with respondent personally
but did know him by sight and had seen him "several times" prior to
May 5. Glover, when alone, viewed the photograph for the first time upon his
return to headquarters on May 7; he identified the person shown as the one from
whom he had purchased the narcotics.
The
toxicological report on the contents of the glassine bags revealed the presence
of heroin. The report was dated July 16, 1970. Respondent was arrested on July
27 while visiting at the apartment of a Mrs. Ramsey on the third floor of 201
Westland. This was the apartment at which the narcotics sale had taken place on
May 5. Brathwaite testified: "Lots of times I have been there before in
that building." He also testified that Mrs. Ramsey was a friend of his
wife, that her apartment was the only one in the building he ever visited, and
that he and his family, consisting of his wife and five children, did not live
there but at 453 Albany Avenue, Hartford.
Respondent
[Brathwaite] was charged, in a two-count information, with possession and sale
of heroin. At his trial in January 1971, the photograph from which Glover had
identified respondent was received in evidence without objection on the part of
the defense. Glover also testified that, although he had not seen respondent in
the eight months that had elapsed since the sale, "there (was) no doubt
whatsoever" in his mind that the person shown on the photograph was
respondent. Glover also made a positive in-court identification without
objection. No explanation was offered by the prosecution for the failure to
utilize a photographic array or to conduct a lineup.
Respondent,
who took the stand in his own defense, testified that on May 5, the day in
question, he had been ill at his Albany Avenue apartment ("a lot of back
pains, muscle spasms . . . a bad heart . . . high blood pressure . . .
neuralgia in my face, and sinus," and that at no time on that particular
day had he been at 201 Westland.
His wife testified that she
recalled, after her husband had refreshed her memory, that he was home all day
on May 5.
Doctor Wesley M. Vietzke, an
internist and assistant professor of medicine at the University of Connecticut,
testified that respondent had consulted him on April 15, 1970, and that he took
a medical history from him, heard his complaints about his back and facial
pain, and discovered that he had high blood pressure. The physician found
respondent, subjectively, "in great discomfort." Respondent in fact
underwent surgery for a herniated disc at L5 and S1 on August 17.
The
jury found respondent guilty on both counts of the information. He received a
sentence of not less than six nor more than nine years. His conviction was
affirmed per curiam [a brief opinion] by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. That
court noted the absence of an objection to Glover's in-court identification and
concluded that respondent "has not shown that substantial injustice
resulted from the admission of this evidence." Under Connecticut law, substantial
injustice must be shown before a claim of error not made or passed on by the
trial court will be considered on appeal.
Fourteen
months later, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut. He alleged that the
admission of the identification testimony at his state trial deprived him of
due process of law to which he was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court, by an unreported written opinion based on the court's review of
the state trial transcript, dismissed respondent's petition. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, with
instructions to issue the writ unless the State gave notice of a desire to
retry respondent and the new trial occurred within a reasonable time to be
fixed by the District Judge.
In brief summary, the court felt
that evidence as to the photograph should have been excluded, regardless of
reliability, because the examination of the single photograph was unnecessary
and suggestive. And, in the court's view, the evidence was unreliable in any
event. We granted certiorari.
Opinion
…Petitioner [Commissioner of
Corrections]…acknowledges that "the procedure in the instant case was
suggestive (because only one photograph was used) and unnecessary"
(because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance). The respondent, in
agreement with the Court of Appeals, proposes a per se rule of exclusion that
he claims is dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process. He rightly observes that this is the first case in which this
Court has had occasion to rule upon…out-of-court identification evidence of the
challenged kind.
Since
the decision in Biggers [excerpted
earlier in this chapter], the Courts of Appeals appear to have developed at
least two approaches to such evidence. The first, or per se approach, employed
by the Second Circuit in the present case, focuses on the procedures employed
and requires exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence, without
regard to reliability, whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily
suggested confrontation procedures. The justifications advanced are the
elimination of evidence of uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and
prosecutors, and the stated "fair assurance against the awful risks of
misidentification."
The second, or more lenient,
approach is one that continues to rely on the totality of the circumstances. It
permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if, despite the suggestive
aspect, the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of
reliability. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not mandated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This second approach, in
contrast to the other, is ad hoc and serves to limit the societal costs imposed
by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation
by the trier of fact.
Mr. Justice Stevens, in writing for the Seventh
Circuit in Kirby, [discussed in your
text] observed: “There is surprising unanimity among scholars in regarding such
a rule (the per se approach) as essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage
of justice." He pointed out that well-known federal judges have taken the
position that "evidence of, or derived from, a showup identification
should be inadmissible unless the prosecutor can justify his failure to use a
more reliable identification procedure." Indeed, the ALI Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 160.1 and 160.2 (1975) (hereafter Model Code),
frowns upon the use of a showup or the display of only a single photograph.”
The
respondent here stresses the same theme and the need for deterrence of improper
identification practice, a factor he regards as pre-eminent. Photographic
identification, it is said, continues to be needlessly employed. He notes that
the legislative regulation "the Court had hoped would engender," has
not been forthcoming. He argues that a totality rule cannot be expected to have
a significant deterrent impact; only a strict rule of exclusion will have
direct and immediate impact on law enforcement agents. Identification evidence
is so convincing to the jury that sweeping exclusionary rules are required.
Fairness of the trial is threatened by suggestive confrontation evidence, and
thus, it is said, an exclusionary rule has an established constitutional
predicate.
There
are, of course, several interests to be considered and taken into account. The
driving force behind United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87
S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (right to counsel at a post-indictment
line-up), and Stovall, all decided on
the same day, was the Court's concern with the problems of eyewitness identification.
Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under
circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of
the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions
of the police. Thus, Wade and its
companion cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony
unless that evidence has aspects of reliability. It must be observed that both
approaches before us are responsive to this concern. The per se rule, however,
goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without
consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is
reliable and relevant.
The
second factor is deterrence. Although the per se approach has the more
significant deterrent effect, the totality approach also has an influence on
police behavior. The police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive
procedures under the totality rule, as well as the per se one, for fear that
their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable.
The third factor is the effect on
the administration of justice. Here the per se approach suffers serious
drawbacks. Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on
occasion, in the guilty going free. Also, because of its rigidity, the per se
approach may make error by the trial judge more likely than the totality
approach. And in those cases in which the admission of identification evidence
is error under the per se approach but not under the totality approach cases in
which the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure reversal is a Draconian sanction. Unlike a warrantless
search, a suggestive preindictment identification procedure does not in itself
intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest. Thus, considerations urging
the exclusion of evidence deriving from a constitutional violation do not bear
on the instant problem. Certainly, inflexible rules of exclusion that may
frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed recently by this
Court with unlimited enthusiasm…. The standard, after all, is that of fairness
as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment….
We turn, then, to the facts of
this case and apply the analysis:
1. The opportunity to view. Glover testified that for two to three
minutes he stood at the apartment door, within two feet of the respondent. The
door opened twice, and each time the man stood at the door. The moments passed,
the conversation took place, and payment was made. Glover looked directly at
his vendor. It was near sunset, to be sure, but the sun had not yet set, so it
was not dark or even dusk or twilight. Natural light from outside entered the
hallway through a window. There was natural light, as well, from inside the
apartment.
2. The degree of attention. Glover was not a casual or passing
observer, as is so often the case with eyewitness identification. Trooper
Glover was a trained police officer on duty and specialized and dangerous duty
when he called at the third floor of 201 Westland in Hartford on May 5, 1970.
Glover himself was a Negro and unlikely to perceive only general features of
"hundreds of Hartford black males," as the Court of Appeals stated.
It is true that Glover's duty was that of ferreting out narcotics offenders and
that he would be expected in his work to produce results. But it is also true
that, as a specially trained, assigned, and experienced officer, he could be
expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail, for he knew that subsequently
he would have to find and arrest his vendor. In addition, he knew that his
claimed observations would be subject later to close scrutiny and examination
at any trial.
3. The accuracy of the
description. Glover's description was given to D'Onofrio within minutes
after the transaction. It included the vendor's race, his height, his build,
the color and style of his hair, and the high cheekbone facial feature. It also
included clothing the vendor wore. No claim has been made that respondent did
not possess the physical characteristics so described. D'Onofrio reacted
positively at once. Two days later, when Glover was alone, he viewed the
photograph D'Onofrio produced and identified its subject as the narcotics
seller.
4. The witness' level of certainty. There is no dispute that the
photograph in question was that of respondent. Glover, in response to a
question whether the photograph was that of the person from whom he made the
purchase, testified: "There is no question whatsoever." Tr. 38. This
positive assurance was repeated. Id., at 41-42.
5. The time between the crime and the confrontation. Glover's
description of his vendor was given to D'Onofrio within minutes of the crime.
The photographic identification took place only two days later. We do not have
here the passage of weeks or months between the crime and the viewing of the
photograph.
These indicators of Glover's
ability to make an accurate identification are hardly outweighed by the
corrupting effect of the challenged identification itself. Although
identifications arising from single-photograph displays may be viewed in
general with suspicion, we find in the instant case little pressure on the
witness to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a display entails. D'Onofrio had
left the photograph at Glover's office and was not present when Glover first
viewed it two days after the event. There thus was little urgency and Glover
could view the photograph at his leisure. And since Glover examined the
photograph alone, there was no coercive pressure to make an identification
arising from the presence of another. The identification was made in
circumstances allowing care and reflection.
Although
it plays no part in our analysis, all this assurance as to the reliability of
the identification is hardly undermined by the facts that respondent was
arrested in the very apartment where the sale had taken place, and that he
acknowledged his frequent visits to that apartment. Mrs. Ramsey was not a
witness at the trial.
Surely, we cannot say that under
all the circumstances of this case there is "a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification." Short of that point, such evidence is
for the jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment
of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is
customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they
cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has
some questionable feature.
Of
course, it would have been better had D'Onofrio presented Glover with a
photographic array including "so far as practicable . . . a reasonable
number of persons similar to any person then suspected whose likeness is
included in the array." Model Code, s 160.2(2). The use of that procedure
would have enhanced the force of the identification at trial and would have
avoided the risk that the evidence would be excluded as unreliable. But we are
not disposed to view D'Onofrio's failure as one of constitutional dimension to be
enforced by a rigorous and unbending exclusionary rule. The defect, if there be
one, goes to weight and not to substance.
We conclude that the criteria laid
down in Biggers are to be applied in
determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning
a post-Stovall identification, and
that those criteria are satisfactorily met and complied with here.
The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
Concurring
Opinion
Justice STEVENS, concurring.
…The arguments in favor of
fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of convicting the innocent on the
basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony carry substantial force.
Nevertheless,…I am persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed
more effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial
fiat and that the Federal Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by
the States in the development of such rules….
Dissent
Justice MARSHALL, with whom
Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Today's
decision can come as no surprise to those who have been watching the Court
dismantle the protections against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected a
decade ago in United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). But it is still
distressing to see the Court virtually ignore the teaching of experience
embodied in those decisions and blindly uphold the conviction of a defendant
who may well be innocent.
…The foundation of the Wade was the Court's recognition of the
"high incidence of miscarriage of justice" resulting from the
admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at criminal trials.
Relying on numerous studies made over many years by such scholars as Professor
Wigmore and Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
the Court concluded that "the vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification." It is, of course, impossible to control one source of
such errors the faulty perceptions and unreliable memories of witnesses except
through vigorously contested trials conducted by diligent counsel and judges.
The Court in the Wade cases acted, however, to minimize
the more preventable threat posed to accurate identification by "the
degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents
the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification."…
Despite my strong disagreement
with the Court over the proper standards [the totality of the circumstances
instead of the per se rule] to be applied in this case,… assuming applicability
of the totality test enunciated by the Court, the facts of the present case
require [the exclusion of the identification in this case because it raises a
very substantial likelihood of misidentification].
I
consider first the opportunity that Officer Glover had to view the suspect.
Careful review of the record shows that he could see the heroin seller only for
the time it took to speak three sentences of four or five short words, to hand
over some money, and later after the door reopened, to receive the drugs in
return. The entire face-to-face transaction could have taken as little as 15 or
20 seconds. But during this time, Glover's attention was not focused
exclusively on the seller's face. He observed that the door was opened 12 to 18
inches, that there was a window in the room behind the door, and, most
importantly, that there was a woman standing behind the man. Glover was, of
course, also concentrating on the details of the transaction he must have
looked away from the seller's face to hand him the money and receive the drugs.
The observation during the conversation thus may have been as brief as 5 or 10
seconds.
As
the Court notes, Glover was a police officer trained in and attentive to the
need for making accurate identifications. Nevertheless, both common sense and
scholarly study indicate that while a trained observer such as a police officer
"is somewhat less likely to make an erroneous identification than the
average untrained observer, the mere fact that he has been so trained is no guarantee
that he is correct in a specific case. His identification testimony should be
scrutinized just as carefully as that of the normal witness." Moreover,
"identifications made by policemen in highly competitive activities, such
as undercover narcotic agents . . ., should be scrutinized with special
care." Yet it is just such a searching inquiry that the Court fails to
make here.
Another
factor on which the Court relies the witness' degree of certainty in making the
identification is worthless as an indicator that he is correct. Even if Glover
had been unsure initially about his identification of respondent's picture, by
the time he was called at trial to present a key piece of evidence for the
State that paid his salary, it is impossible to imagine his responding
negatively to such questions as "is there any doubt in your mind
whatsoever" that the identification was correct. As the Court noted in Wade: "It is a matter of common
experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the (pretrial
confrontation), he is not likely to go back on his word later on."
Next, the Court finds that because
the identification procedure took place two days after the crime, its
reliability is enhanced. While such temporal proximity makes the identification
more reliable than one occurring months later, the fact is that the greatest
memory loss occurs within hours after an event. After that, the dropoff
continues much more slowly. Thus, the reliability of an identification is
increased only if it was made within several hours of the crime. If the time
gap is any greater, reliability necessarily decreases. Reviewing a number of
its cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
several years ago that while showups occurring up to perhaps 30 minutes after a
crime are generally permissible, one taking place four hours later, far removed
from the crime scene, was not.
Finally,
the Court makes much of the fact that Glover gave a description of the seller
to D'Onofrio shortly after the incident. Despite the Court's assertion that
because "Glover himself was a Negro and unlikely to perceive only general
features of 'hundreds of Hartford black males,' as the Court of Appeals
stated," the description given by Glover was actually no more than a general
summary of the seller's appearance. We may discount entirely the seller's
clothing, for that was of no significance later in the proceeding. Indeed, to
the extent that Glover noticed clothes, his attention was diverted from the
seller's face. Otherwise, Glover merely described vaguely the seller's height,
skin color, hairstyle, and build. He did say that the seller had "high
cheekbones," but there is no other mention of facial features, nor even an
estimate of age.
Conspicuously absent is any
indication that the seller was a native of the West Indies, certainly something
which a member of the black community could immediately recognize from both
appearance and accent. Brathwaite had come to the United States from his native
Barbados as an adult.
It is also noteworthy that the
informant who witnessed the transaction and was described by Glover as
"trustworthy,” disagreed with Glover's recollection of the event. The
informant testified that it was a woman in the apartment who took the money
from Glover and gave him the drugs in return. From all of this, I must conclude
that the evidence of Glover's ability to make an accurate identification is far
weaker than the Court finds it.
In contrast, the procedure used to
identify respondent was both extraordinarily suggestive and strongly conducive
to error. In dismissing "the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification" procedure here, the Court virtually grants the police
license to convict the innocent. By displaying a single photograph of respondent
to the witness Glover under the circumstances in this record almost everything
that could have been done wrong was done wrong.
In
the first place, there was no need to use a photograph at all. Because photos
are static, two-dimensional, and often outdated, they are "clearly
inferior in reliability" to corporeal procedures. While the use of
photographs is justifiable and often essential where the police have no
knowledge of an offender's identity, the poor reliability of photos makes their
use inexcusable where any other means of identification is available. Here,
since Detective D'Onofrio believed that he knew the seller's identity, further
investigation without resort to a photographic showup was easily possible.
With little inconvenience, a
corporeal lineup including Brathwaite might have been arranged. Indeed, the
police carefully staged Brathwaite's arrest in the same apartment that was used
for the sale, indicating that they were fully capable of keeping track of his
whereabouts and using this information in their investigation.
Properly conducted, such a
procedure would have gone far to remove any doubt about the fairness and
accuracy of the identification. It should be noted that this was not a case
where the witness knew the person whom he saw committing a crime, or had an
unusually long time to observe the criminal, so that the identification
procedure was merely used to confirm the suspect's identity. For example, had
this been an ongoing narcotics investigation in which Glover had met the seller
a number of times, the procedure would have been less objectionable.
Worse
still than the failure to use an easily available corporeal identification was
the display to Glover of only a single picture, rather than a photo array. With
good reason, such single-suspect procedures have "been widely
condemned." They give no assurance that the witness can identify the
criminal from among a number of persons of similar appearance, surely the
strongest evidence that there was no misidentification. In Simmons v. United States, our first decision involving photographic
identification, we recognized the danger that a witness seeing a suggestively
displayed picture will "retain in his memory the image of the photograph
rather than of the person actually seen." "Subsequent identification
of the accused then shows nothing except that the picture was a good
likeness." As Simmons warned,
the danger of error is at its greatest when "the police display to the
witness only the picture of a single individual . . . and is also heightened if
the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that . . . the
person pictured committed the crime."
The
use of a single picture (or the display of a single live suspect, for that
matter) is a grave error, of course, because it dramatically suggests to the
witness that the person shown must be the culprit. Why else would the police
choose the person? And it is deeply ingrained in human nature to agree with the
expressed opinions of others particularly others who should be more knowledgeable
when making a difficult decision.
In this case, moreover, the
pressure was not limited to that inherent in the display of a single
photograph. Glover, the identifying witness, was a state police officer on
special assignment. He knew that D'Onofrio, an experienced Hartford narcotics
detective, presumably familiar with local drug operations, believed respondent
to be the seller. There was at work, then, both loyalty to another police
officer and deference to a better-informed colleague.
[Footnote: In fact, the trial
record indicates that D'Onofrio was remarkably ill-informed, although it does
not appear that Glover knew this at the time of the identification. While the
Court is impressed by D'Onofrio's immediate response to Glover's description,
that cannot alter the fact that the detective, who had not witnessed the
transaction, acted on a wild guess that respondent was the seller. D'Onofrio's
hunch rested solely on Glover's vague description, yet D'Onofrio had seen
respondent only "several times, mostly in his vehicle." There was no
evidence that respondent was even a suspected narcotics dealer, and D'Onofrio
thought that the drugs had been purchased at a different apartment from the one
Glover actually went to. The identification of respondent provides a perfect
example of the investigator and the witness bolstering each other's inadequate
knowledge to produce a seemingly accurate but actually worthless
identification.]
The
Court discounts this overwhelming evidence of suggestiveness, however. It
reasons that because D'Onofrio was not present when Glover viewed the
photograph, there was "little pressure on the witness to acquiesce in the
suggestion." That conclusion blinks psychological reality. There is no
doubt in my mind that even in D'Onofrio's absence, a clear and powerful message
was telegraphed to Glover as he looked at respondent's photograph. He was
emphatically told that "this is the man," and he responded by
identifying respondent then and at trial "whether or not he was in fact
'the man.' "
[Footnote: This discussion does not imply any lack of respect for the honesty and dedication of the police. We all share the frailties of human nature that create the problem. Justice Frank O'Connor of the New York Supreme Court decried the dangers of eyewitness testimony in a recent article that began with this caveat:
From the vantage point of ten years as District Attorney of Queens County (1956-1966) and six years on the trial bench (1969 to (1974)), the writer holds in high regard the professional competence and personal integrity of most policemen. Laudable instances of police efforts to clear a doubtful suspect are legion. Deliberate, willful efforts to frame or railroad an innocent man are totally unknown, at least to me. Yet, once the best-intentioned officer becomes honestly convinced that he has the right man, human nature being what it is, corners may be cut, some of the niceties forgotten, and serious error committed.]
I must conclude that this record
presents compelling evidence that there was "a very substantial likelihood
of misidentification" of respondent Brathwaite. The suggestive display of
respondent's photograph to the witness Glover likely erased any independent
memory that Glover had retained of the seller from his barely adequate
opportunity to observe the criminal.
Accordingly, I dissent from the
Court's reinstatement of respondent's conviction.
Questions
1. What precisely was the totality of circumstances taken into account in this case?
2. Do you think it demonstrates “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”?
3. Do you agree that Jimmy Glover had sufficient opportunity to observe Brathwaite? To describe him accurately? To identify the photograph positively? If not, was this harmless error?
4. Is the dissent correct in saying that the Court is “dismantling the protections against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected... in United States v. Wade”?
5. Is the dissent correct in arguing that the Court wrongfully evaluated the impact of the exclusionary rule and the totality of circumstances? Evaluate those arguments.
6. Is the dissent’s stress on Brathwaite’s Barbados ancestry important? Explain.
7. Would you side with the dissent or the majority in this case?
8. Has the majority sacrificed accuracy at the expense of finality? At the expense of law enforcement, as the dissent maintains?
9. Is the majority fostering a false sense of security in that the public believes the government has caught the criminal in many cases in which the criminal remains at large?