Supreme
Court of the United States.
UNITED STATES
v.
CAROLENE PRODUCTS CO.
No. 640.
Argued April 6, 1938.
Decided April 25, 1938.
The
Carolene Products Company was indicted for shipping in interstate commerce a
compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil made in imitation or
semblance of condensed milk or cream. Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the
indictment, and the United States appeals.
Mr. Justice STONE delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The
question for decision is whether the ‘Filled Milk Act’ of Congress of March 4, 1923,
c. 262, 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U.S.C. ss 61--63, 21 U.S.C.A. s 61--63, [1] which prohibits the
shipment in *146 interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any
fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream, transcends the
power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce or infringes the Fifth Amendment.
Appellee was indicted in the District
Court for Southern Illinois for violation of the act by the shipment in
interstate commerce of certain packages of ‘Milnut,’ a compound of condensed
skimmed milk and coconut oil made in imitation
or semblance of condensed milk or cream. The indictment states, in the words of
the statute, that Milnut ‘is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the
public health,’ and that it is not a prepared food product of the type excepted
from the prohibition of the act.
Appellee
assails the statute as beyond the power of Congress over interstate commerce,
and hence an invasion of a field of action said to be reserved to the states by
the Tenth Amendment. Appellee also complains that the *147 statute
denies to it equal **781 protection of the laws, and in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, deprives it of its property without due process of law,
particularly in that the statute purports to make binding and conclusive upon
appellee the legislative declaration that appellee’s product ‘is an adulterated
article of food, injurious to the public health, and its sale constitutes a
fraud on the public.’
First. The power to regulate commerce is
the power ‘to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed, and
extends to the prohibition of shipments in such commerce. The power ‘is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’ Hence Congress is
free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in the states for
which they are destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the
public health, morals, or welfare, or which contravene the policy of the state
of their destination.
Such
regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power either because its motive
or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the
states of destination, and is not prohibited unless by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. And it is no objection to the exertion of the power to
regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same
incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states. *148
The prohibition of the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce is a
permissible regulation of commerce, subject only to the restrictions of the
Fifth Amendment.
Second. The prohibition of shipment of
appellee’s product in interstate commerce does not infringe the Fifth
Amendment. Twenty years ago this Court, in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 39
S.Ct. 125, 63 L.Ed. 255, held that a state law which forbids the manufacture
and sale of a product assumed to be wholesome and nutritive, made of condensed
skimmed milk, compounded with coconut oil, is not forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power of the Legislature to secure a minimum of particular
nutritive elements in a widely used article of food and to protect the public
from fraudulent substitutions, was not doubted; and the Court thought that
there was ample scope for the legislative
judgment that prohibition of the offending article was an appropriate means of
preventing injury to the public.
We see no
persuasive reason for departing from that ruling here, where the Fifth
Amendment is concerned; and since none is suggested, we might rest decision
wholly on the presumption of constitutionality. But affirmative evidence also
sustains the statute. In twenty years evidence has steadily accumulated of the
danger to the public health from the general consumption of foods which have
been stripped of elements essential to the maintenance of health. The Filled
Milk Act was adopted by Congress after committee hearings, in the course of
which eminent scientists and health experts testified.
An
extensive investigation was made of the commerce in milk compounds in which
vegetable oils have been substituted for natural milk fat, and of the effect
upon the public health of the use of such compounds as a food substitute for
milk. The conclusions drawn from evidence presented at the hearings were embodied
in reports of the *149 House Committee on Agriculture, and the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Both committees concluded, as the
statute itself declares, that the use of filled milk as a substitute for pure
milk is generally injurious **782 to health and facilitates fraud on the
public.[2]
There
is nothing in the Constitution which compels a Legislature, either national or
state, to ignore such evidence, nor need it disregard the other evidence which
amply supports the conclusions of the Congressional committees that the danger
is greatly enhanced where an inferior product, like appellee’s, is
indistinguishable from *150 a valuable food of almost universal use,
thus making fraudulent distribution easy and protection of the consumer difficult.[3]
When the Filled Milk Act was passed, eleven states had rigidly controlled
the exploitation of filled milk, or forbidden it altogether. Some thirty-five
states have now adopted laws which in terms, or by their operation, prohibit
the sale of filled milk.
**783 *151 Here
the prohibition of the statute is inoperative unless the product is ‘in
imitation or semblance of milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not
condensed.’ Section 1(c), 21 U.S.C.A. s 61(c). Whether in such circumstance the
public would be adequately protected by the prohibition of false labels and
false branding imposed by the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 21 U.S.C.A. s 1 et seq.,
or whether it was necessary to go farther and prohibit a substitute food
product thought to be injurious to health if used as a substitute when the two
are not distinguishable, was a matter for the legislative judgment and not that
of courts. It was upon this ground that the prohibition of the sale of
oleomargarine made in imitation of butter was held not to infringe the
Fourteenth Amendment….
Appellee raises no valid objection to the
present statute by arguing that its prohibition has not been extended to
oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegetable fats or oils are
substituted for butter fat. The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause,
and even that of the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel
their Legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none. A Legislature may hit
at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another.
*152 Third. We
may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a Legislature can
forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts
by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that a statute
would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of
all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor
of life, liberty, or property had a rational basis.
But such we think is not the purpose or
construction of the statutory characterization of filled milk as injurious to
health and as a fraud upon the public. There is no need to consider it here as
more than a declaration of the legislative findings deemed to support and
justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion of the legislative power,
aiding informed judicial review, as do the reports of legislative committees,
by revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the absence of such
aids, the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.[4] The present statutory
findings affect appellee no more than the reports of the Congressional
committees and since in the absence of the statutory findings they would be
presumed, their incorporation in the statute is no more prejudicial than
surplusage.
Where the existence of a rational basis
for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond
the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of
judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the
existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the
court that those facts have ceased to exist. Similarly we recognize that the
constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may be assailed by proof of
facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a particular *154
article is without support in reason because the article, although within the
prohibited class, is so different from others of the class as to be without the
reason for the prohibition, though the effect of such proof depends on the
relevant circumstances of each case, as for example the administrative
difficulty of excluding the article from the regulated class. But by their very
nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question,
must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or
which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it. Here the demurrer
challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it is evident from all
the considerations presented to Congress, and those of which we may take
judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable whether commerce in
filled milk should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or
wholly prohibited. As that decision was for Congress, neither the finding of a
court arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be **785
substituted for it.
The prohibition of shipment in interstate
commerce of appellee’s product, as described in the indictment, is a
constitutional exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce. As the
statute is not unconstitutional on its face, the demurrer should have been
overruled and the judgment will be reversed.
Reversed.
*155 Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the result
and in all of the opinion except the part marked ‘Third.’
Mr.
Justice McREYNOLDS thinks that the judgment should be affirmed.
Mr.
Justice CARDOZO and Mr. Justice REED took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Mr. Justice BUTLER.
I concur
in the result. Prima facie the facts alleged in the indictment are sufficient
to constitute a violation of the statute. But they are not sufficient
conclusively to establish guilt of the accused. At the trial it may introduce
evidence to show that the declaration of the act that the described product is injurious to public health and that
the sale of it is a fraud upon the public are without any substantial
foundation. The provisions on which the indictment rests should if possible be
construed to avoid the serious question of constitutionality. If construed to
exclude from interstate commerce wholesome food products that demonstrably are
neither injurious to health nor calculated to deceive, they are repugnant to
the Fifth Amendment. The allegation of the indictment that Milnut ‘is an
adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health,’ tenders an issue
of fact to be determined upon evidence.
58 S.Ct.
778, 304 U.S. 144, 82 L.Ed. 1234
[1] The relevant portions of the
statute are as follows:
‘Section 61. * * * (c) The term ‘filled milk’ means any
milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated,
concentrated, Powdered, dried, or desiccated, to which has been added, or which
has been blended or compounded with, any fat or oil other than milk fat, so
that the resulting product is in imitation or semblance of milk, cream, or
skimmed milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated, concentrated, powdered,
dried, or desiccated.’
‘s 62. * * * It is declared that filled milk, as herein
defined, is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health, and
its sale constitutes a fraud upon the public. It shall be unlawful for any
person to * * * ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce,
any filled milk.’
Section 63 imposes as penalties for violations ‘a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.’
[2] The reports may be summarized as follows: There is an extensive commerce in milk compounds made of condensed milk from which the butter fat has been extracted and an equivalent amount of vegetable oil, usually coconut oil, substituted. These compounds resemble milk in taste and appearance and are distributed in packages resembling those in which pure condensed milk is distributed. By reason of the extraction of the natural milk fat the compounded product can be manufactured and sold at a lower cost then pure milk. Butter fat, which constitutes an important part of the food value of pure milk, is rich in vitamins, food elements which are essential to proper nutrition, and are wanting in vegetable oils. The use of filled milk as a dietary substitute for pure milk results, especially in the case of children, in undernourishment, and induces diseases which attend malnutrition. Despite compliance with the branding and labeling requirements of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 21 U.S.C.A. s 1 et seq., there is widespread use of filled milk as a food substitute for pure milk. This is aided by their identical taste and appearance, by the similarity of the containers in which they are sold, by the practice of dealers in offering the inferior product to customers as being as good as or better than pure condensed milk sold at a higher price, by customers’ ignorance of the respective food values of the two products, and in many sections of the country by their inability to read the labels placed on the containers. Large amounts of filled milk, much of it shipped and sold in bulk, are purchased by hotels and boarding houses, and by manufactures of food products, such as ice cream, to whose customers labeling restrictions afford no protection.
[3] There is now an extensive literature indicating wide recognition by scientists and dietitians of the great importance to the public health of butter fat and whole milk as the prime source of vitamins, which are essential growth producing and disease preventing elements in the diet. See Dr. Henry C. Sherman, The Meaning of Vitamin A, in Science, Dec. 21, 1928, p. 619; Dr. E. V. McCollum et al., The Newer Knowledge of Nutrition, 1929 Ed., pp. 134, 170, 176, 177; Dr. A. S. Root, Food Vitamins (N. Car. State Board of Health, May, 1931), p. 2; Dr. Henry C. Sherman, Chemistry of Food and Nutrition (1932), p. 367; Dr. Mary S. Rose, The Foundations of Nutrition. 1933, p. 237.
[4]
There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct.
484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458; on restraints upon the dissemination of
information, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713--714, 718--720, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630, 632, 633, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; Lovell v.
Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v.
California, supra, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73
A.L.R. 1484; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108;
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373--378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 647, 649, 71 L.Ed.
1095; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066; and see
Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed.
1138; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646, or racial minorities. Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428, 4 L.Ed. 579; South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734, decided February 14, 1938, note 2, and cases cited.